United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is the United States of America's (âthe
governmentâ) limited motion to reconsider. (ECF No. 464).
Defendant Susan Siegel (âdefendantâ) filed a response (ECF
No. 466), to which the government replied (ECF No. 467).
was sentenced to three years of probation on April 29, 2019.
(ECF Nos. 441, 444). Defendant was ordered to pay a $116,
021.25 in person criminal forfeiture and $1, 124, 652.00 in
restitution. (ECF Nos. 442, 444). Probation has instructed
defendant to make monthly restitution payments equal to ten
percent (10%) of her monthly income, which results in
payments of roughly $260 per month. (ECF No. 456 at 3).
moved this court to modify the conditions of her probation
and allow her to borrow approximately $104, 000 against her
home in order to pay the majority of the criminal forfeiture.
Id. Defendant represented that her significant other
would assist with making payments on the loan. Id.
Defendant also requested that her monthly restitution
payments be reduced to $50 in light of the monthly payments
on her proposed loan and modest financial means. Id.
government did not respond or otherwise oppose
defendant's motion. The government now represents that it
“inadvertently failed to respond to [defendant's]
underlying motion because the Financial Litigation Unit of
the United States Attorney's Office for the District of
Nevada . . . did not receive a copy of the motion before the
response deadline.” (ECF No. 467 at 1). The government
now moves this court to reconsider its order
“only to the extent that it permits
[d]efendant . . . to pay $104, 000 toward her criminal
forfeiture money judgment instead of her significant
restitution order.” (ECF No. 464 at 1).
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly
authorize the filing of motions for reconsideration, a
“postjudgment motion for reconsideration may be filed
in a criminal case and governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).”
United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.7
(9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Fiorelli,
337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (“As noted by the
Second and Ninth Circuits, motions for reconsideration may be
filed in criminal cases.”).
motion for reconsideration “should not be granted,
absent highly unusual circumstances.” Marlyn
Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571
F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). “Reconsideration is
appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly
discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial
decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an
intervening change in controlling law.” School
Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1993); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
“permits a district court to reconsider and amend a
previous order.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d
934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
However “the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be
used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation
of judicial resources.” Id. A motion for
reconsideration is also an improper vehicle “to raise
arguments or present evidence for the first time when they
could reasonably have been raised earlier in
litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d
initial matter, the court notes that the government's
“statutory obligation” to “use its best
efforts to ensure [defendant's] victims' ‘right
to full and timely restitution' is met” would have
been better achieved by filing a response to defendant's
motion in the first instance. (ECF No. 467 at 5). The
government should have moved for an extension of time upon
receiving a copy of the motion. The government did not.
Nonetheless, the court finds good cause to reconsider its
prior order in light of the legal authority in the instant
money received from a defendant shall be disbursed so that
each of the following obligations is paid in full in the
(1) A penalty assessment under section 3013 of title 18,