United States District Court, D. Nevada
J. DAWSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Dozier's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of
habeas corpus is before the court for final disposition on
the merits (ECF No. 6).
Background & Procedural History
December 2004, a jury convicted Dozier of two counts of
robbery with a deadly weapon (counts 1 and 2) and burglary
(count 3). Exh. 31. The state district court sentenced him as
follows: 72 to 180 months each on counts 1 and 2, with a like
and consecutive term for the deadly weapon enhancement on
each count; 72 to 180 months on count 3, counts 1 and 2 to
run consecutively, and count 3 to run concurrently. Exh. 36,
p. 24. Judgment was entered in February 2005. Exh. 37.
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Dozier's convictions and
subsequently affirmed the denial of his state postconviction
petition. Exhs. 56, 85.
court originally granted respondents' motion to dismiss
this federal petition as time-barred, and judgment was
entered (ECF No. 25, 26). Dozier ultimately filed a motion
for relief from judgment, which demonstrated that respondents
had failed to provide this court with the complete
state-court record and that the complete state-court record
demonstrated that Dozier's federal petition was in fact
timely (ECF No. 36). This court vacated the judgment and
directed respondents to answer grounds 1 and 3 (ECF No. 48).
Respondents have answered, and petitioner filed a reply (ECF
No. 53, 54).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
U.S.C. § 2254(d), a provision of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), provides the legal
standards for this court's consideration of the petition
in this case:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim ―
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court's role in
reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent
federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that
state-court convictions are given effect to the extent
possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 693-694 (2002). This Court's ability to grant a writ
is limited to cases where “there is no possibility
fair-minded jurists could disagree that the state court's
decision conflicts with [Supreme Court] precedents.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The
Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case
for relief does not mean the state court's contrary
conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); see
also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)
(describing the AEDPA standard as “a difficult to meet
and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given
the benefit of the doubt”) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme
Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
“if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's]
cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision
of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent.”
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000), and citing
Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly
established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme
Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.”
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 74 (quoting Williams,
529 U.S. at 413). The “unreasonable application”
clause requires the state court decision to be more than
incorrect or erroneous; the state court's application of
clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.
Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
extent that the state court's factual findings are
challenged, the “unreasonable determination of
fact” clause of § 2254(d)(2) controls on federal
habeas review. E.g., Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d
943, 972 (9th Cir.2004). This clause requires that the
federal courts “must be particularly deferential”
to state court factual determinations. Id. The
governing standard is not satisfied by a showing merely that
the state court finding was “clearly erroneous.”
393 F.3d at 973. Rather, AEDPA requires substantially more
.... [I]n concluding that a state-court finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court
record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar
circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court
decision. Rather, we must be convinced that an appellate
panel, applying the normal standards of appellate ...