United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER (DOCKET NO. 66)
J. KOPPE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is Plaintiffs Krystal Johnson and Elizabeth
Spangler's motion to compel answers to interrogatories.
Docket No. 66. The Court has considered Plaintiffs'
motion and Defendant's response. Docket Nos. 66, 71. No.
reply was filed. See Docket. The motion is properly
resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For
the reasons stated below, the motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED
a class-action case that arises from casino-floor massage
services in the Bellagio's poker room. Docket No. 9 at
4-5. Plaintiffs performed those services pursuant to
agreements with Defendant, which had a contract to provide
the services. Docket No. 66 at 2. Plaintiffs allege
that-after Defendant lost the contract-Defendant interfered
with Plaintiffs' efforts to work for the company that
took over the contract. Id. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defendant failed to pay them owed overtime wages,
that Defendant fired them for bringing this case, and that
Defendant misclassified them as independent contractors.
Id.; see also Docket No. 9 at 15-23.
3, 2019, Plaintiffs propounded interrogatories on Defendant.
Docket No. 66 at 3. After a conference between
Plaintiffs' and Defendant's counsel, the parties'
disputes about the interrogatories were narrowed to three.
See Id. at 3-7. Plaintiffs then filed the pending
motion to compel. Docket No. 66.
trial court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery.
Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).
The scope of discovery is limited to nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to a party's claim or defense and is
proportional to the needs of the case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
The party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of
showing why the discovery should not be allowed.
Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th
Cir. 1975). The party that resists discovery must
detail-through “specific examples and articulated
reasoning”-why each discovery request is objectionable,
and may not rely on boilerplate, generalized, conclusory, or
speculative arguments. See U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars
Ent., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006); see also
F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D. Nev.
move to compel responses to three interrogatories: Nos. 3, 4,
and 10. Docket No. 66 at 3-7. “An interrogatory may
relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule
26(b).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(2). Interrogatories are
intended “to enable a party to prepare for trial, to
narrow the issues and thus help determine what evidence will
be needed at the trial, and to reduce the possibility of
surprise at the trial.” 8B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.
§ 2162 (3d ed.). “Toward [those ends], Rule 26(b)
is liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of
information even [if] the information may not be admissible
at the trial.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232
F.R.D. 633, 635 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The Court analyzes the
three disputed interrogatories in turn.
Provide the date on which [Defendant] first learned it would
not be contracted to perform massage services at the Bellagio
after December 7, 2018 and identify how [Defendant] first
became aware of this information, including identifying any
person(s) who transmitted such information to [Defendant] and
identifying the means through which such information was
No. 66 at 4. Defendant objected to this interrogatory and
submitted that it (1) is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad; (2)
is argumentative and assumes facts not in the record; (3) is
irrelevant; (4) is disproportional to the needs of the case;
(5) is unduly burdensome or costly; and (6) is confidential
and proprietary. Id. However, the only basis on
which Defendant submits an argument in its response to the
motion to compel is that the interrogatory requests
irrelevant information. Docket No. 71 at 3-4. The Court
therefore analyzes only that basis.
submits that this interrogatory requests irrelevant
information because, for a claim of intentional interference
with contractual relations, Plaintiffs must establish only:
“(1) the existence of ‘a valid and existing
contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract;
(3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the
contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
contract; and (5) resulting damage.'” Id.
at 3 (citing J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 71 P.3d
1264, 1267 (Nev. 2003)). Defendant submits that “the
only act alleged by Plaintiffs that allegedly interfered with
their contracts” occurred after Defendant's
contract expired with the Bellagio. Docket No. 71 at 3.
Plaintiffs submit, however, that the information the
interrogatory requests is relevant because if Defendant
“knew well in advance of the end of the Bellagio
contract that it would not be renewed, . . . [it] would
support an intentional interference claim.” Docket No.
66 at 5.
Court disagrees with Plaintiffs. When Defendant learned of
this information is irrelevant because the alleged
interference happened after Defendant lost the contract and
Plaintiffs do not allege that they had contracts with the
company that took over the contract before Defendant lost the
contract. In other words, when Defendant knew that the
contract would not be renewed is irrelevant because it does
not bear on any element of a claim of intentional