United States District Court, D. Nevada
REBEKAH CHARLESTON; ANGELA DELGADO-WILLIAMS; and LEAH ALBRIGHT-BYRD, Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF NEVADA; STEVE SISOLAK, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Nevada; and the LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, Defendants.
ORDER
MIRANDA M. DU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
SUMMARY
This
case is brought by women who have been profoundly harmed by
sexual violence as victims of sex trafficking in Nevada and
other states. Sex trafficking of course is illegal, and
Plaintiffs seek to halt sex trafficking by challenging
Nevada's statutes allowing for certain counties to
legalize prostitution. In gist, Plaintiffs' lawsuit is
premised on the contention that the existence of legal
prostitution in certain counties and localities in Nevada
allows for sex trafficking to flourish and thus conflicts
with federal laws. While the Court empathizes with Plaintiffs
for their lived experiences, the Court cannot adjudicate
Plaintiffs' claims because Plaintiffs fail to establish
standing to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Accordingly,
the Court will grant Defendants' motions to dismiss (ECF
Nos. 22, 31).
II.
BACKGROUND
The
following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”), [1] unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiffs
Rebekah Charleston, Angela Delgado-Williams, and Leah
Albright-Byrd are all from states other than Nevada and
currently reside in Texas. Charleston alleges that she was
sexually exploited mostly in Nevada's legal brothels
until she was trafficked into Las Vegas's illegal sex
trade. Delgado-Williams makes allegations of being forced by
a pimp into illegal prostitution in Texas, later trafficked
into Las Vegas where she was enticed through fraud to engage
in the illegal sex trade. She was also trafficked to perform
sex acts for money in other large cities such as Los Angeles,
California, Chicago, Illinois and Boston, Massachusetts
before being trafficked back to Las Vegas. Albright-Byrd
claims that she was trafficked from Sacramento, California to
Reno, Nevada and was then trafficked by pimps from Reno to
Las Vegas and in various cities across Nevada, and in the
“Bay Area” of California.
In the
FAC, Plaintiffs plead federal constitutional claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of their
civil rights (claims one and two) and a third claim for
declaratory/injunctive relief. Plaintiffs named as defendants
the State of Nevada (“State”), Steve Sisolak-in
his official capacity as Governor of Nevada
(“Governor”)-and the Legislature of the State of
Nevada (“Legislature”) (collectively,
“Defendants”). (ECF No. 12.)
Plaintiffs
rely on federal criminal statutes that generally prohibit
individuals from engaging in travel or acts affecting
interstate or foreign commerce and that relate to illegal
prostitution or sex trafficking. These laws include the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7114 (2018), The Mann
Act, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2018), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591 (2018), which prohibits sex /// trafficking of
children or by force, fraud, or coercion. Plaintiffs assert
that, per the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United
States Constitution, these statutes preempt Nevada
statutes-NRS §§ 201.354(1) and 244.345(8)-that give
less populated counties in Nevada the local option of
allowing businesses to operate “a licensed house of
prostitution” and similarly preempt the local
ordinances that have exercised the option. In particular,
Plaintiffs assert that:
Because the brothel industry in Nevada openly and notoriously
persuades, induces, entices, and coerces individuals to
travel in interstate commerce to commit acts of prostitution,
[Nevada's statutes and local ordinances licensing and
regulating legal brothels] cannot exist simultaneously with
[the federal criminal laws] and thereby [are] preempted and
in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
(ECF No. 12 at 38-39.)
In
their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs ask for declaratory
judgment that Nevada's statutes and local ordinances
licensing and regulating legal brothels are
“unconstitutional [and] null and void as preempted by
federal law, ” and a preliminary and permanent
injunction “prohibiting the [State] and all of its
political subdivisions from implementing, enforcing, or
putting into force and effect” its statutes and local
ordinances licensing and regulating legal brothels.
(Id. at 39.) Plaintiffs also ask for an order
requiring the State to allocate funds in an amount not less
than $2, 000, 000 per year to the State Contingency Account
for deposit to a special fund, designated as the
“Nevada Sex Trade Exit Fund, ” to be used for
specified reasons by persons who prove certain requirements.
(Id.)
Defendants
have moved to dismiss the FAC under, inter alia,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. (ECF Nos. 22,
31).[2]
Because the Court will dismiss this case for lack of
standing, the Court does not address Defendants' other
asserted grounds for dismissal.
III.
12(B)(1) LEGAL STANDARD
Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
defendants to seek dismissal of a claim or action for a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1)
is appropriate if the complaint, considered in its entirety,
fails to allege facts on its face that are sufficient to
establish subject matter jurisdiction. In re Dynamic
Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, 546
F.3d 981, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2008). Although the defendant is
the moving party in a motion to dismiss brought under Rule
12(b)(1), the plaintiff is the party invoking the court's
jurisdiction. As a result, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that ...