United States District Court, D. Nevada
April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the
court's order entering summary judgment against plaintiff
Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”). Pursuant to the
Ninth Circuit's directive, the court hereby adjudicates
this matter consistent with Bank of America, N.A. v.
Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Association, 920 F.3d
620 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Arlington West”).
action involves the foreclosure and sale of the real property
at 3984 Meadow Foxtail Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada. (ECF No. 1).
BANA confirms that Sunrise Ridge recorded a notice of
delinquent assessment lien on August 31, 2010. Id.
Next, BANA indicates that Sunrise Ridge recorded a notice of
default and election to sell on November 9, 2010.
Id. Finally, Sunrise Ridge recorded a notice of
trustee's sale on June 21, 2011. Id. BANA
alleges that the amount owned on each of these notices did
not specify the superpriority lien amount owed. Id.
predecessor-in-interest offered to tender the superpriority
lien amount to Sunrise Ridge, based upon its own
calculations, but Sunrise Ridge rejected the $378.00 offered
amount. Id. The relevant tender letter indicated
that the offer amount was “non-negotiable” and
that “any endorsement of [the] cashier's check . .
. will be strictly construed as an unconditional acceptance
on your part of the facts stated herein and express agreement
that . . . financial obligations towards the HOA . . . have
now been ‘paid in full.'” (ECF No. 1-1 at 5).
complaint alleges four claims: (1) quiet title/declaratory
judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113
against Sunrise Ridge and Nevada Association Services
(“NAS”); (3) wrongful foreclosure against Sunrise
Ridge and NAS; and (4) injunctive relief against Saticoy.
(ECF No. 1).
BANA supports its quiet title/declaratory judgment claim by
arguing that NRS Chapter 116 violates BANA's procedural
due process right, the recorded notices vaguely described the
super-priority amount owed on the HOA lien, tender for the
HOA lien was improperly rejected, and by challenging the
foreclosure sale buyers' bona fide purchaser
March 17, 2016, Saticoy filed a counterclaim to quiet title
in the property and to request declaratory relief. (ECF No.
8). Both Sunrise Ridge and the other defendants'
respective motions for summary judgment seek a finding that
the sale extinguished BANA's interest in the property.
(ECF Nos. 35, 37).
March 10, 2017, the court dismissed BANA's breach of NRS
116.1113 and wrongful foreclosure claims. (ECF No. 51). On
May 5, 2017, the court entered summary judgment, holding that
the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. (ECF No.
55). On June 5, 2017, BANA appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
(ECF No. 57). On April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded, directing the court to adjudicates this matter
consistent with Arlington West. (ECF No. 56). The
court now adjudicates this action consistent with the Ninth
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims . . . .” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323- 24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
non-moving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, the court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden
Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, “[i]n such a case, the moving party has the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of fact on each issue material to its case.”
contrast, when the non-moving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the non-moving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing ...