United States District Court, D. Nevada
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for the Holders of Harborview 2005-14 Trust, Plaintiff,
PACIFIC SUNSET VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
J. Dawson, United States District Judge
before the Court is Defendants Saticoy Bay, LLC Series 2995
E. Sunset Road Unit 103's and 2995 E. Sunset Rd. Un. 103
Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment (#62). Plaintiff
(“Deutsche Bank”) filed a response in opposition
(#70) to which Defendants replied (#73).
before the Court is Plaintiff Deutsche Bank's Motion for
Summary Judgment (#63). Defendant Pacific Sunset Village
Homeowners Association (“Pacific Sunset”) filed a
response in opposition (#64). Defendants Saticoy Bay, LLC
Series 2995 E. Sunset Road Unit 103 (“Saticoy
Bay”) and 2995 E. Sunset Rd. Un. 103 Trust (“the
Trust”) also filed a response in opposition (#65).
Plaintiff replied (#69/71).
about May 3, 2005, Lisa Galanti purchased property located at
2995 East Sunset Road #103, Las Vegas, Nevada 89120
(“the Property”). This purchase was made by way
of a loan in the amount of $168, 000.00 evidenced by a note
and secured by a deed of trust (“senior deed of
trust”), which was recorded on May 23, 2005. The senior
deed of trust was eventually assigned to Deutsche Bank. The
Property was subject to Pacific Sunset's Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions and Reservation of
Easements (“the CC&Rs”) which required
payment of assessments.
March 27, 2012, Pacific Sunset Village Homeowners'
Association, through its agent, Nevada Association Services,
Inc. (“NAS”), recorded a notice of delinquent
assessment lien. The notice indicated that the amount owed to
PACIFIC SUNSET was $1, 943.50, which includes late fees,
collection fees and interest in the amount of $843.50.
10, 2012, Pacific Sunset, through its agent NAS, recorded a
notice of default and election to sell to satisfy the
delinquent assessment lien in the amount of $3, 179.50. The
notice did not specify the superpriority amount claimed by
Pacific Sunset. Thereafter, on January 9, 2013, Pacific
Sunset through its agent NAS, recorded a notice of
trustee's sale, which was scheduled for February 1, 2013.
The notice stated that the amount due to Pacific Sunset was
$5, 077.67 but did not identify the superpriority amount
claimed by Pacific Sunset.
13, 2012, Bank of America, N.A., the servicer of the loan at
the time, requested a ledger from Pacific Sunset, through the
HOA's agent NAS, to identify the superpriority amount
allegedly owed to Pacific Sunset and offered to pay that
amount. Pacific Sunset did not provide a payoff amount. On
January 9, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of foreclosure sale.
Foreclosure sale was conducted on February 1, 2013. The Trust
purchased the Property at the sale for $5, 790.00. On June
25, 2014, the Property was sold to Saticoy Bay. Deutsche Bank
then filed the present action on September 14, 2016. The
parties have each filed summary judgment seeking a
declaration as to whether Pacific Sunset's foreclosure
extinguished Deutsche Bank's lien or whether Saticoy
Bay's predecessor in interest, the Trust, purchased the
property subject to the lien. Defendants have also moved to
dismiss this action based on the statute of limitations.
Standard for Summary Judgment
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials by
disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
(1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). It is
available only where the absence of material fact allows the
Court to rule as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Rule 56 outlines a burden
shifting approach to summary judgment. First, the moving
party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to produce specific evidence of a genuine factual dispute for
trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine issue of fact
exists where the evidence could allow “a reasonable
jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The Court views the evidence and draws all available
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). Yet, to
survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show more
than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
has filed for summary judgment on its claims and the opposing
parties have filed for summary judgment on the claims against
them. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that
Deutsche Bank's deed of trust was extinguished by Pacific
Sunset's foreclosure of its superpriority lien.
Therefore, Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment is
denied and Defendants' motions for summary judgment are
Statute of Limitations
reaching the merits of Deutsche Bank's motion, Saticoy
Bay and Pacific Sunset urge the Court to deny this action as
untimely. Defendants argue that Deutsche Bank's quiet
title and declaratory relief claims are subject to a
three-year statute of limitations, which began accrual at the
time Pacific Sunset foreclosed- February 1, 2013. If a
three-year statute of limitations applies, the bank had until
February 1, 2016 to bring its claims. Deutsche Bank filed its
complaint on September 14, 2016. Accordingly, Defendants
argue that Deutsche Bank's claims are time-barred. The
crux of Defendants' argument is that Deutsche Bank's
claims are not true quiet title claims because the bank never
actually held title in the property. The bank is actually
bringing an action to enforce rights regarding satisfaction
of a superpriority lien which is a right created by statute.
According to NRS § 11.190, the applicable statute of
limitations for liability created under statute is three
years. NRS § 11.090(3)(a). Defendants, therefore, claim
that Deutsche Bank's claims are time-barred.
are incorrect. Admittedly, courts in this district disagree
on the appropriate statute of limitations for this type of
claim. Deutsche Bank does not allege that it ever held title.
Rather, the bank uses the quiet title claim as a vehicle to
assert the validity of its preexisting interest in the
Property. Despite the district's split, no Court has
found that a three-year statute of limitations is appropriate
for these claims. They disagree whether a four-year or a
five-year limitations period applies. The disagreement boils down
to whether a claim in the context of a nonjudicial
foreclosure constitutes a claim to recover property
under NRS § 11.080. If so, a five-year limitations period
applies. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Nevada Supreme Court
have applied a five-year statute of limitations to these
actions. See Weeping Hollow Ave. Tr. v. Spencer, 831
F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2016) (party may bring claim
challenging the HOA foreclosure within five years of the
sale); Las Vegas Dev. Grp., LLC v. Blaha, 416 P.3d
233, 237 (Nev. 2018) (a claim “seeking to quiet title .
. . is governed by NRS § 11.080, which provides for a
five-year statute of limitations”).
a minority of courts have determined that § 11.080 does
not apply to this type of quiet title claim because the bank
or lender never actually held title-nor do these banks claim
to have ever held title. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. SFR Invs.
Pool 1, LLC, 376 F.Supp.3d 1085, 1089-91 (D. Nev. 2019).
Those courts have found that NRS § 11.220's
so-called “catch-all” provision imposes a
four-year statute of limitations because the bank cannot
recover property to which it never held title. See
NRS § 11.220 (where the Nevada Revised Statutes are
silent regarding a statute of limitations, a four-year period
event, the Court need not resolve this dispute here. Deutsche
Bank's claims are timely under either § 11.220's
four-year catch-all provision or § 11.080's
five-year period for recovery of real property. At the
latest, Deutsche Bank's claims began accrual on February
1, 2013, when NAS recorded the trustee's deed upon sale.
See G & H Assocs. v. Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc., 934 P.2d 229, 233 (Nev. 1997) (accrual begins
when the plaintiff first knew or should have known of the
injury). Deutsche Bank brought this suit in September of
2016-less than four years from the date of accrual.
Therefore, the Court need not definitively decide whether
Deutsche Bank's quiet title claim is subject to a