United States District Court, D. Nevada
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. Plaintiff,
HARTRIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
J. DAWSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (#51). Defendant Hartridge Homeowners
Association (“Hartridge”) filed a response in
opposition (#56) as did Defendant Saticoy Bay, LLC series
5528 Meridian Rain (“Saticoy Bay”) (#58) to which
Plaintiff replied (#60/61).
before the Court is Defendant Hartridge Homeowners
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment (#52) to which
Defendant Absolute Collection Services, LLC filed a Joinder
(#54). Bank of America filed a response in opposition (#59).
before the Court is Defendant Saticoy Bay's Motion for
Summary Judgment (#53). Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.
(“BANA”) filed a response in opposition (#57) to
which Saticoy Bay replied (#62).
E. Dugay (“Borrower”) financed her property
located at 5528 Meridian Rain Street, North Las Vegas, Nevada
(“the Property”) with a $118, 030 loan secured by
a deed of trust. On or about July 7, 2014, the deed of trust
was assigned to Plaintiff BANA.
Property is subject to and governed by the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions and Grant of Easements
(“CC&Rs”) for Hartridge Homeowners
Association. Eventually, Borrower defaulted on her obligation
to pay assessments of approximately $76 per month under the
CC&Rs to Hartridge. On October 30, 2013, Hartridge
through its foreclosure agent, Defendant Absolute Collection
Services (“ACS”), recorded notice of delinquent
assessment lien. ACS recorded notice of default and election
to sell on December 30, 2013. The notice stated that Borrower
owed $2, 155.33 plus costs and fees without specifying which
part was the superpriority lien.
January 31, 2014, BANA's counsel, Miles Bauer Bergstrom
& Winters, LLP (“Miles Bauer”) offered to pay
the superpriority lien and asked for a total. In response,
ACS provided an account statement showing nine months of
assessments and costs and fees totaling $2, 484.35. The
statement did not indicate that they owed any maintenance or
nuisance abatement charges. Based on the ledger, BANA
calculated the superpriority amount as $684.00 (nine months
of assessments) and tendered that amount by check to ACS on
March 13, 2014. ACS received and accepted the tender on
behalf of Hartridge.
proceeded with the foreclosure sale, because “ the
Borrower and BANA failed to continue paying assessments
[after ACS accepted the tender].” At the foreclosure
sale, ACS circulated a bid sheet saying that the
superpriority amount had been paid and the crier of the sale
announced that the superpriority amount had been paid.
Foreclosure sale was conducted on June 17, 2014 and the
foreclosure deed was recorded on June 19, 2014. Saticoy Bay
purchased the property for $10, 100.00. The parties now
disagree as to whether Hartridge's foreclosure
extinguished BANA's lien or whether Saticoy Bay purchased
the property subject to the lien.
Standard for Summary Judgment
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials by
disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
(1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). It is
available only where the absence of material fact allows the
Court to rule as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Rule 56 outlines a burden
shifting approach to summary judgment. First, the moving
party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to produce specific evidence of a genuine factual dispute for
trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine issue of fact
exists where the evidence could allow “a reasonable
jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The Court views the evidence and draws all available
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). Yet, to
survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show more
than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
America argues that its deed of trust survived
Hartridge's nonjudicial foreclosure for four discrete
reasons: (1) the bank tendered the superpriority portion of
the HOA lien; (2) the association foreclosed under an
unconstitutional version of NRS § 116 and violated due
process as-applied; (3) the Supremacy Clause preempts NRS
§ 116; and (4) the sale was unfair and should be
equitably set aside under Shadow Canyon. Because the
Court finds Bank of America's tender argument
dispositive, it need not reach the bank's other
arguments. Hartridge and Saticoy Bay, on the other hand, move
for summary judgment on their quiet title claims. Saticoy Bay
seeks a declaration that Hartridge's foreclosure
extinguished both BANA's and Borrower's interest in