United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, District Judge.
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
59), filed by Plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(“Plaintiff). Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 63), to which
Plaintiff filed a Reply, (ECF No. 66).
pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 60), filed by SFR. Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF
No. 62), to which SFR filed a Reply, (ECF No. 67).
reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED, and SFR's Motion
for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
case arises from the foreclosure on real property located at
137 Coventry Drive, Henderson, NV 89074 (the
“Property”). (See Compl. ¶ 7, ECF
No. 1). In 2007, Lloyd Q. Allen (“Borrower”)
obtained a loan from First Franklin Financial Corp.
(“Franklin”) in the amount of $303, 000.00,
secured by a deed of trust recorded on April 23, 2007.
(See Deed of Trust, ECF No. 59-1). The deed of trust
initially identified Franklin as the beneficiary.
(Id.). U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S.
Bank”) later received the interest through an
assignment. (Assignment to U.S. Bank, ECF No. 59-2). U.S.
Bank then assigned its interest to Bank of America, N.A.
(“BANA”). (Assignment to BANA, ECF No. 59-3).
After the events giving rise to the instant dispute, BANA
assigned its interest to Plaintiff. (See Assignment
to Nationstar, ECF No. 59-4).
August 2, 2010, upon Borrower's failure to stay current
on his loan obligations, Green Valley South Owners
Association No. 1 (“HOA”) initiated foreclosure
proceedings on the Property through its agent, Nevada
Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”). (See
Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien, ECF No. 59-5); (see
also Notice of Default and Election to Sell, ECF No.
59-6). On June 30, 2011, NAS recorded a notice of
trustee's sale, scheduling a public auction to take place
on July 22, 2011. (See Notice of Foreclosure Sale,
ECF No. 59-7).
February 3, 2011, following the first notice of sale, BANA,
through counsel, sent NAS a letter requesting a ledger
identifying the superpriority portion of HOA's lien so
that BANA could satisfy the balance. (See Accounting
Request, Ex. 2 to Miles Bauer Aff., ECF No. 59-8). NAS
responded by providing a statement of account reflecting an
annual assessment of $98. (NAS Resp. Letter, Ex. 3 to Miles
Bauer Aff., ECF No. 59-8). Based upon the record, BANA's
counsel calculated HOA's superpriority lien amount-nine
months of common assessments (three-fourths, or nine out of
twelve months' worth, of the $98 annual amount)- and sent
NAS a check for the total, $73.50, which NAS rejected.
(See Tender Letter, Ex. 4 to Miles Bauer Aff., ECF
No. 59-8); (see also Confirmation of Receipt, Ex. 5
to Miles Bauer Aff.). NAS proceeded with foreclosure and sold
the Property to SFR for $4, 900.00 on September 7, 2012.
(See Foreclosure Deed, ECF No. 59-10).
filed the instant action on April 18, 2016, asserting the
following causes of action arising from HOA's foreclosure
and subsequent sale of the Property: (1) quiet title; (2)
breach of NRS 116.1113; (3) wrongful foreclosure; and (4)
injunctive relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-73, ECF
No. 1). Both Plaintiff and SFR filed competing
summary-judgment Motions with respect to Plaintiff's
claims, (ECF Nos. 59-60).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving
party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must
be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving
party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To
establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of
the nonmoving party is ...