United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company’s (“Deutsche Bank”) motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 41). Defendant/cross
claimant/counter claimant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) filed a response (ECF No. 49), to which
Deutsche Bank replied (ECF No. 50).
before the court is SFR’s motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 46). Deutsche Bank filed a response (ECF No. 48), to
which SFR replied (ECF No. 51).
action arises from a dispute over real property located at
1013 Echo Beach Avenue, North Las Vegas, Nevada 89086
(“the property”). (ECF No. 1).
L. Wright and Donna C. Gentry (“borrowers”)
purchased the property on or about June 21, 2005.
Id. The borrowers financed the purchase with a loan
in the amount of $214, 050.00 from First Franklin, a Division
of National City Bank of Indiana (“First
Franklin”). Id. First Franklin secured the
loan with a deed of trust, which names First Franklin as the
lender and beneficiary, and Fidelity National Title as the
trustee. (ECF No. 1-2). Deutsche Bank acquired all beneficial
interest in the deed of trust via an assignment, which
Deutsche Bank recorded with the Clark County recorder’s
office on June 28, 2015. (ECF No. 1-3).
January 19, 2012, Springs at Centennial Ranch Homeowners
Association (“HOA”), through its agent Alessi
& Koenig, LLC (“A&K”), recorded a notice
of delinquent assessment lien (“the lien”)
against the property for the borrowers’ failure to pay
the HOA in the amount of $1, 083.46. (ECF No. 46-1). On May
22, 2012, A&K recorded a notice of default and election
to sell pursuant to the lien, stating that the amount due was
$1, 966.96 as of April 25, 2012. Id.
December 7, 2012, the HOA recorded a first notice of
foreclosure sale against the property. Id. On
October 10, 2013, the HOA recorded a second notice of
foreclosure sale against the property. Id. On
November 6, 2013, the HOA sold the property in a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale to SFR in exchange for $17, 000.00.
Id. On November 13, 2013, SFR recorded the deed of
foreclosure with the Clark County recorder’s office.
(ECF No. 46-2).
April 3, 2018, Deutsche Bank filed a complaint, alleging a
single cause of action: quiet title/declaratory relief
pursuant to NRS 116.3116 et seq. (ECF No. 1).
Deutsche Bank and SFR have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, requesting that the court resolve whether the
foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. (ECF Nos.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to withstand summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. Where the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, “it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party’s case on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323–24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial
burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need
not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. See
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). The opposing party need not establish a dispute of
material fact conclusively in its favor. See T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809
F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). It is sufficient that
“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury
or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of
the truth at trial.” Id.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth, but to determine
whether a genuine dispute exists for trial. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of
the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
See Id . at 249–50.
Bank and SFR have filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
disputing whether the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed
of trust. (ECF Nos. 41, 46). Because neither Deutsche Bank
nor SFR have provided sufficient grounds to enter summary
judgment in their respective favor, the court will deny both
Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not
require any particular elements, but each party must plead
and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff’s right to relief therefore depends on
superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
a plaintiff must show that its claim to the property is
superior to all others in order to succeed on a quiet title
action. See also Breliant v. Preferred Equities
Corp., 918 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1996) (“In a quiet
title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
prove good title in himself.”).
116.3116 et seq. (“Chapter 116”) allows an
HOA to place a lien on its homeowners’ residences for
unpaid assessments and fines. Nev. Rev. Stat. §
116.3116(1). Under NRS 116.3116(2), HOA liens have priority
over other encumbrances. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2).
However, some encumbrances are not subject to an HOA
lien’s priority, including “[a] first security
interest on the unit recorded before the date on which the
assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2)(b).
116 then provides an exception to the subparagraph (2)(b)
exception for first security interests. See Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 116.3116(2). In SFR Investments Pool 1
v. U.S. Bank, the Nevada Supreme Court provided the
As to first deeds of trust, NRS 116.3116(2) thus splits an
HOA lien into two pieces, a superpriority piece and a
subpriority piece. The superpriority piece, consisting of the
last nine months of unpaid HOA dues and maintenance and
nuisance-abatement charges, is “prior to” a first
deed of trust. The subpriority piece, consisting of all other
HOA fees or assessments, is subordinate to a first deed of
334 P.3d 408, 411 (Nev. 2014) (“SFR
Chapter 116, an HOA can enforce its superpriority lien with a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Id. at 415. Thus,
“NRS 116.3116(2) provides an HOA a true superpriority
lien, proper foreclosure of which will extinguish a first
deed of trust.” Id. at 419; see also
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 116.31162(1) (providing that
“the association may foreclose its lien by sale”
upon compliance with the statutory notice and timing rules).
116.31166(1) provides that when an HOA forecloses on a
property pursuant to NRS 116.31164, the following recitals in