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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Garner

United States District Court, D. Nevada

September 17, 2019

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-2, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-2, Plaintiff,
v.
LEMMIE GARNER; SUSAN CARLILE; WOODLAND VILLAGE HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, Defendants. LEMMIE GARNER AND SUSAN CARLILE, Counterclaimants,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-2, ASSET-BACKED CERITIFACTED, SERIES 2007-2, Counter-Defendant.

          ORDER

          MIRANDA M. DU, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. SUMMARY

         This dispute arises from the foreclosure sale (“HOA Sale”) of real property to satisfy a homeowners' association lien. Before the Court is Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Wells Fargo Bank's (“Wells Fargo”) motion for summary judgment (“Motion”) on its quiet title/declaratory relief claims (ECF No. 42). The Court has reviewed Defendant Woodland Village Homeowner's Association's (“HOA”) response (ECF No. 45) as well as Wells Fargo's reply (ECF No. 48). Defendants/Counterclaimants Lemmie Garner and Susan Carlile (“Buyers”) did not file an opposition to Wells Fargo's Motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants Wells Fargo's Motion and dismisses Wells Fargo's remaining claims as moot.

         II. BACKGROUND

         The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

         Yanira Maldonado (“Borrower”) purchased real property located at 17710 Fairfax Court, Reno, Nevada 89508 (“Property”) on September 28, 2006. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) The Borrower financed the purchase of the Property with a loan secured by a first deed of trust (“DOT”) that was recorded against the Property in November 2006. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 2.) The DOT identified Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One”) as the Lender and Beneficiary and secured repayment in the amount of $218, 250. (Id.)

         American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (as successor-in-interest to Option One) assigned all beneficial interest in the DOT to Wells Fargo in an assignment recorded in December 2008. (ECF No. 1 -3 at 2.) Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One assigned the beneficial interest again to Wells Fargo in an assignment recorded July 2014. (ECF No. 1-4 at 2.)

         The Borrower became delinquent on her HOA assessments, and the HOA's trustee, Hampton & Hampton, P.C. (“Trustee”), instituted a notice of delinquent assessment lien against the Property in February 2012. (ECF No. 42-1 at 10-12.) The notice was not recorded. (ECF No. 42 at 3; see ECF No. 45 at 3-5, 8-10.) The Trustee then recorded a notice of default and election to sell on April 13, 2012. (ECF No. 1-5 at 2-3.) Wells Fargo was the beneficiary of the DOT at that time. (ECF No. 42 at 4; see ECF No. 45 at 3-5.) The notice of default was mailed only to the Borrower-not Wells Fargo. (ECF No. 42 at 4 (quoting ECF No. 42-2 at 4-5); see ECF No. 45 at 3-5.) The Trustee recorded a notice of trustee's sale on December 23, 2013. (ECF No. 1-6 at 2-4.) The notice of trustee's sale was mailed to the Borrower, Option One, and the Nevada Real Estate Division Ombudsman's Office, but not Wells Fargo. (ECF No. 42 at 5 (quoting ECF No. 42-2 at 6-7); see ECF No. 45 at 3-5, 8-10.) The Trustee then recorded a trustee's deed upon sale indicating that the Buyers acquired their interest in the Property at a sale (“HOA Sale”) on March 11, 2014, for $19, 000. (ECF No. 1-7 at 2-4.)

         Wells Fargo asserts the following claims in the Complaint: (1) quiet title/declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, NRS § 30.010 et seq., and NRS § 40.010 against all defendants; (2) declaratory relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments against all defendants; (3) quiet title under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments against all defendants; (4) permanent and preliminary injunction against the Buyers; (5) unjust enrichment against the Buyers; and (6) fraud in the inducement, or alternatively promissory estoppel and breach of contract against the HOA. (ECF No. 1 at 9-16.)

         The Buyers assert a counterclaim for unjust enrichment related to alleged improvements they made to the Property. (ECF No. 16 at 4.)

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric, 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

         The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Moreover, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).

         IV. ...


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