United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, District Judge
before the Court is Defendant Stanley Joe Polk's
(“Defendant”) Motion to Modify Conditions of
Supervised Release, (ECF No. 38). The Government filed a
Response, (ECF No. 39), and Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No.
43). Additionally, the Court received a report from the U.S.
Probation Office. For the reasons discussed below,
Defendant's Motion to Modify Conditions of Supervised
Release, (ECF No. 38), is GRANTED in part and DENIED
October 23, 2014, Defendant pled guilty to Transportation of
an Individual for the Purpose of Prostitution, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421. (See Mins of Proceeding, ECF No. 26).
On March 10, 2015, Defendant was sentenced to 46 months in
custody and 20 years of supervised release. (J., ECF No. 31).
In regard to Defendant's term of supervised release, the
Court imposed certain conditions of supervision, including
the following special condition: “Sex Offender
Treatment - You shall successfully complete a treatment
program for sex offenders, which may include polygraph/truth
verification testing, as approved by the probation officer. .
. .” (Id.). Defendant's supervision
commenced on August 3, 2017. Defendant now moves to modify
the conditions of his supervised release.
18 Section 3583(e)(2) of the United States Code allows a
court to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of
supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or
termination of the term of supervised release[.]” 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e). When making this determination, a
court considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) deterrence of criminal conduct; (3) protection of the
public; (4) the need to provide the defendant with
educational, vocational training, medical care, or other
rehabilitation; (5) the sentence and sentencing range
established for the category of defendant; (6) any pertinent
policy statement by the Sentencing Commission; (7) the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct; and (8) the need to provide restitution to any
victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
instant Motion, Defendant requests that the Court
“modify conditions of [Defendant's] supervised
release to remove the special condition of polygraph
testing.” (Mot. to Modify Conditions
(“Mot.”) 3:2-3, ECF No. 38). Defendant argues
that polygraph testing is “unnecessary since he has
successfully completed this condition for a significant
time.” (Id. 2:20-21). Defendant emphasizes
that polygraph testing is unreliable and that it subjects him
to the risk of a significant deprivation of liberty.
Government responds that “[D]efendant was convicted of
trafficking a juvenile for prostitution. Polygraph testing in
connection with sex offender treatment in this case serves
the statutory sentencing purposes of public protection,
deterrence, and rehabilitation.” (Resp. 2:10- 13, ECF
No. 39) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d),
replies by reiterating the arguments made in his Motion and
clarifying that he seeks that the Court remove both polygraph
and truth verification testing. (Reply 2:26, ECF No. 43).
Further, Defendant argues that this type of testing will not
help shape a course of treatment for him, nor serve as a
deterrent because such tests do not provide “the
motivation to be truthful during the examination (because the
exam does not reliably indicate truthful responses) nor the
incentive to refrain from prohibited activity (because the
exam does not reliably uncover deceitful responses).”
(See Reply 5:13-6:1).
contrast, the Probation Office's report recommends that
Defendant's Motion be denied, and indicates that due to
the nature of Defendant's offense, Defendant should be
subject to polygraph and truth verification testing for a
period of at least five years and obtain a successful
discharge from sex offender counseling before consideration
is made to remove the testing component of the sex offender
review of the parties' arguments and relevant filings,
the Court denies Defendant's request to remove the
polygraph and truth verification testing component of the sex
offender treatment condition. First, the Court is not
persuaded by Defendant's argument that continued
polygraph and truth verification testing subjects him to the
risk of a significant deprivation of liberty. Treatment
providers use testing as an aid to ensure that they are
addressing the appropriate issues related to a particular
defendant's sexual history and any current or future
sexual deviancy. Moreover, polygraph testing is “a
relatively unintrusive means of evaluating a defendant's
risk of engaging in sexual misconduct.” United
States v. Hohag, 893 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2018)
(citing United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 568
(9th Cir. 2006)). As such, the Court will not remove the
polygraph and truth verification component at this time.
Defendant will continue sex offender treatment, which may
include polygraph and truth verification testing, as approved
by the probation officer. However, taking the Probation
Office's report into account, the Court will hold the sex
offender treatment condition in abeyance upon completion of
five years of testing and Defendant's successful
discharge from sex offender counseling.
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to
Modify Conditions of Supervised Release, (ECF No. 38), is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
Court denies Defendant's request to remove the
polygraph/truth verification component of the sex offender
treatment condition at this time. However, upon completion of
five years of polygraph/truth verification testing and