United States District Court, D. Nevada
MIRANDA M. DU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Gregory Harris brings this civil rights lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as an individual incarcerated in the
custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections
(“NDOC”) and currently housed at Saguaro
Correctional Center (“SCC”), a private prison in
Arizona. SCC is operated by a company called CoreCivic.
Before the Court are the CoreCivic
Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36) and the
NDOC Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 50).
The Court has reviewed the responses (ECF Nos. 46, 57) and
replies (ECF Nos. 49, 58) thereto. For the following reasons,
the Court grants both motions.
Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed with the following claims
after screening: (1) an interference with outgoing mail claim
against NDOC Defendants Dzurenda, Carpenter, and Sandie; (2)
a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against NDOC
Defendants Dzurenda and Aranas; and (3) a retaliation claim
against all NDOC Defendants and CoreCivic
Defendants. (ECF No. 7 at 10.)
CORECIVIC DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO.
noted, Plaintiff currently is incarcerated at SCC located in
Arizona. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) Defendant Thomas is the Warden of
SCC and resides in Arizona. (ECF No. 36-1 at 2.) CoreCivic
owns and operates SCC under a correctional service agreement
with the state of Nevada. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendant
Hininger is CoreCivic's chief executive officer and
resides in Tennessee. (Id. at 5.) The CoreCivic
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim
against them for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (ECF No. 36 at 2-8.)
two-part analysis governs whether a court retains personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. “First, the
exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the requirements of the
applicable state long-arm statute.” Chan v.
Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1994). Because “Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS
§ 14.065, reaches the limits of due process set by the
United States Constitution, ” the Court moves on to the
second part of the analysis. See Baker v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023
(Nev. 2000). “Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with federal due process.” Chan, 39
F.3d at 1404-05. “Due process requires that nonresident
defendants have certain minimum contacts with the forum state
so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Id. (citing Int'l Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Courts analyze
this constitutional question with reference to two forms of
jurisdiction: general and specific jurisdiction.
does not seem to argue that the Court has general
jurisdiction over the CoreCivic Defendants. (See ECF
No. 46 at 3 (“[The CoreCivic Defendants] have availed
themselves to [sic] the privilege(s) of conducting regular
activities in and with the State of Nevada, and . . . have
agreed to terms within their contract with the State of
Nevada, it's [sic] agent N.D.O.C., Which satisfy the
specific Jurisdiction Requirements.”).) However,
even if Plaintiff intends to argue that the Court has general
jurisdiction over the CoreCivic Defendants, he has failed to
satisfy the “exacting standard” for general
jurisdiction. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs.,
Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d
797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004)). “To determine whether a
nonresident defendant's contacts are sufficiently
substantial, continuous, and systematic, [courts] consider
their ‘[l]ongevity, continuity, volume, economic
impact, physical presence, and integration into the
state's regulatory or economic markets.'”
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d
1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tuazon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir.
2006)). Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Hininger
“is CEO of Core-Civic, which operates at least one
facility in Nevada, and has done so for [several]
years.” (ECF No. 46 at 3.) Plaintiff also asserts that
Defendant Hininger “is in Nevada, at that facility for
regular inspections and business.” (Id.) The
Court is unpersuaded that these contacts are sufficient in
terms of length, continuity, volume, and other
characteristics to support general jurisdiction over
Defendant Hininger, much less Defendant Thomas. Accordingly,
the Court will consider whether specific jurisdiction over
the CoreCivic Defendants exists.
jurisdiction exists where “[a] nonresident
defendant's discrete, isolated contacts with the forum
support jurisdiction on a cause of action arising directly
out of its forum contacts.” CollegeSource, 653
F.3d at 1075. In the Ninth Circuit, courts use a three-prong
test to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists over a
particular cause of action: “(1) The non-resident
defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum or resident
thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or
relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play
and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.”
Id. at 1076 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374
F.3d at 802). The first prong, alternatively called
purposeful availment or purposeful direction, is often
determinative. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc). In addition, the party asserting
jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating only the first
two prongs. CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1076 (citing
Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir.
1990)). If it does so, the burden shifts to the party
challenging jurisdiction to set forth a “compelling
case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)).
first argues that the CoreCivic Defendants have subjected
themselves to specific jurisdiction based on CoreCivic's
contract with the state of Nevada. (ECF No. 46 at 3-5.) The
Court rejects this argument because Plaintiff has not adduced
evidence that the CoreCivic Defendants personally-as opposed
to CoreCivic itself-are parties to the contract.
also argues that Defendant Hininger has subjected himself to
specific jurisdiction by visiting CoreCivic's Nevada
facility for regular inspections and business. (Id.
at 3.) Plaintiff does not support this allegation with any
admissible evidence. Moreover, Plaintiff's claims do not
arise from Hininger's visits to CoreCivic's Nevada
facility. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was ever
incarcerated at CoreCivic's Nevada facility. Accordingly,
the Court rejects this argument.
also asks the Court for an opportunity to conduct discovery
to establish facts supporting specific jurisdiction. (ECF No.
46 at 5.) However, Plaintiff has not identified specific
facts that he would seek to establish during discovery to
demonstrate personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court
denies this request.
these reasons, the Court grants the CoreCivic Defendants'
motion to dismiss ...