United States District Court, D. Nevada
J. YOUCHAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
the Court is Plaintiff Jesse Noble's Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint (ECF No. 39) and his proposed amended
complaint (ECF No. 39-1). The time for opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion has run with no opposition filed. The
Court now screens Plaintiff's proposed amended civil
rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must
identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that
are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings,
however, must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and (2) that the alleged violation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A,
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a
federal court must dismiss a prisoner's claim, if
“the allegation of poverty is untrue, ” or if the
action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted is provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under
§ 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an
amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under
§ 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend
the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies,
unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the
deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v.
United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of
law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d
719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a
claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker,
175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this
determination, the court takes as true all allegations of
material fact stated in the complaint, and the court
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th
Cir. 1996). Allegations of a pro se complainant are
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not
require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must
provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is
addition, a reviewing court should “begin by
identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no
more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported
with factual allegations.” Id. “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.
all or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may therefore
be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner's claims
lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This
includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable
(e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or
claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does
not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual
allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios).
See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28
(1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795,
798 (9th Cir. 1991).
SCREENING OF PROPOSED [SECOND] AMENDED COMPLAINT
facts underlying Plaintiff's proposed second amended
complaint are essentially the same as those alleged in his
first amended complaint filed on June 5, 2019. Those facts
are not repeated here. However, as was true in the first
amended complaint, which, after screening, was filed
following the Court's Screening Order of that same day
(ECF Nos. 34 and 35), Plaintiff sues multiple defendants for
events that took place while he was incarcerated at High
Desert State Prison (“HDSP”). Plaintiff again
alleges violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Claim (Count I),
Plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint identifies
as defendants HDSP's medical director Remero [sic] Aranas
(previously sued as a “John Doe”), the Jane Doe
nurse who evaluated Plaintiff at his “Arrival Mandatory
[A]ssessment, ” and Dr. Hanf to whom Plaintiff alleges
he sent several Kites regarding medical concerns pertaining
to his eyes. With respect to Plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment Claim (Count II), Plaintiff identifies Dr. Hanf,
Remero [sic] Aranas, HDSP Warden James Dzurenda, and HDSP
Associate Warden of Operations J. Nash.
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment and “embodies ‘broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency.'” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official
violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with
“deliberate indifference” to the serious medical
needs of an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
828 (1994). “To establish an Eighth Amendment
violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective
standard-that the deprivation was serious enough to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment-and a subjective
standard-deliberate indifference.” Snow v.
McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012).
establish the first prong, “the plaintiff must show a
serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a
prisoner's condition could result in further significant
injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096
(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the
deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must show
“(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a
prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm
caused by the indifference.” Id.
“Indifference may appear when prison officials deny,
delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or
it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide
medical care.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). When a prisoner alleges that delay of medical
treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must
show that the delay led to further injury. See Shapley v.
Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404,
407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of
surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of
deliberate medical indifference”).
defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “only
upon a showing of personal participation by the
defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,
1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “A supervisor is only liable for
constitutional violations of his subordinates if the
supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or
knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.
There is no respondeat superior liability under
[§]1983.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (holding that
“[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to
Bivens and § ...