United States District Court, D. Nevada
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., successor by merger to BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP fka COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP and FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiffs,
SANTA BARBARA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC; ABSOLUTE COLLECTION SERVICES, LLC, Defendants. AND RELATED CASES
MIRANDA M. DU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
dispute arises from a non-judicial foreclosure sale of real
property located at 1124 Milpas Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada,
89134, APN 138-30-614-037 (“Property”) to satisfy
a homeowners' association lien (“HOA Sale”).
The dispositive issue is whether Plaintiffs Bank of America,
N.A (“BANA”) and the Federal National Mortgage
Association (“Fannie Mae”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) own a property interest that is
entitled to protection under 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)
(“Federal Foreclosure Bar”). The Court finds in
the affirmative and concludes that Fannie Mae's first
deed of trust was not extinguished by the HOA Sale and thus
continues to encumber the Property.
following facts are undisputed unless otherwise
Lee (“Borrower”) executed a note
(“Note”) and first deed of trust
(“DOT”) that was recorded on February 24, 2006.
(ECF No. 84-1.) The DOT granted Countrywide Bank, N.A.
(“Lender”) a security interest in the Property to
secure repayment of a $231, 000.00 loan that Borrower
obtained from Lender to finance the Property
(“Loan”). (Id. at 2.) Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”)
was listed as the beneficiary, as nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns. (Id.)
Mae's business records show Fannie Mae purchased the Loan
in March 2006. (ECF No. 84-7.) Fannie Mae thereby obtained a
property interest in the DOT. On October 8, 2010, MERS
recorded an assignment of the DOT-together with the Note-to
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP fka Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP (“BAC”). (ECF No. 84-2.) BAC merged
into BANA in 2011.
Mae owned the Loan at the time of the HOA Sale and BANA was
Fannie Mae's contractually authorized loan servicer. (ECF
No. 84-7 at 3-4, 7.)
Sale occurred on January 15, 2013, whereby Defendant SFR
Investments Pool I, LLC's (“SFR”) purchased
the Property for $18, 500.00. (ECF No. 84-6.)
brought this lawsuit on December 2, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) They
allege the following claims: (1) declaratory relief under the
Federal Foreclosure Bar against SFR; (2) quiet title under
the Federal Foreclosure Bar against SFR; (3) declaratory
relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution against SFR; (4) quiet title under the same
amendments against SFR; (5) declaratory judgment against all
Defendants; (6) breach of NRS § 116.1113 against
Defendants Santa Barbara Homeowners Association
(“HOA”) and Absolute Collection Services, LLC
(“ACS”); (7) wrongful foreclosure against these
latter Defendants; and (8) injunctive relief against SFR.
(Id.) All other relief are requested in the
alternative to Plaintiffs' request for quiet title and
declaratory relief under the Federal Foreclosure Bar.
(Id. at 18.) SFR filed counterclaims for quiet title
and injunctive relief against Plaintiffs and Borrower and
Katy L. Lee, Trustee or her successors in trust, under the
Klee Living Trust, dated August 10, 2006. (ECF No. 8 at 12.)
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there
is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden
shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the
pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. Moreover, a court views all facts and draws all
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
“when parties submit cross-motions for summary
judgment, ‘[e]ach motion must be considered on its own
merits.'” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty.,
Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
2001) (citations omitted) (quoting William W. Schwarzer,
et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary
Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 499 (Feb. 1992)). “In
fulfilling its duty to review ...