United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE
before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 38),
filed by Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”). Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.
(“BANA”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 39), and SFR
filed a Reply, (ECF No. 40).
pending before the Court are the Motions for Summary
Judgment, (ECF Nos. 58, 59), filed by BANA and SFR. BANA and
SFR filed Responses to the Motions, (ECF Nos. 62, 65), as
well as Replies in support of their respective Motions, (ECF
Nos. 66, 67).
reasons discussed herein, SFR's Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Summary Judgment are DENIED, and
BANA's Motion for Summary Judgment is
quiet title action arises from the foreclosure on real
property located at 7617 Brilliant Forest Street, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89131 (the “Property”). (See
Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1). In 2009, Frederick L. Gallegos
Jr. (“Borrower”) obtained a loan from Meridias
Capital (“Meridias”) in the amount of $199,
863.00, secured by a deed of trust recorded on January 30,
2009. (See Deed of Trust, ECF No. 58-1). The deed of
trust initially identified Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as beneficiary, solely as
nominee for Medias. (Id.). BANA was later assigned
all beneficial interest in the deed of trust following an
assignment and subsequent corporate merger. (See
Assignment, ECF No. 58-2); (see Merger Certificate,
ECF No. 58-3).
April 16, 2010, upon Borrower's failure to stay current
on his loan obligations, Lamplight Village at Centennial
Springs Homeowners Association (“HOA”) initiated
foreclosure proceedings on the Property through its agent,
Alessi & Koenig, LLC (“A&K”).
(See Notice of Lien, ECF No. 58-4); (see
also Notice of Default, ECF No. 58-6). On December 15,
2011, A&K recorded of notice of trustee's sale, and
later a second notice of trustee's sale, scheduling a
public auction to take place on September 5, 2012.
(See Notices of Sale, ECF Nos. 58-7, 58-8).
January 26, 2012, following the first notice of sale, BANA
sent A&K a letter requesting the superpriority portion of
HOA's lien and stating an intent to satisfy the balance.
(See Accounting Request, Ex. 1 to Miles Bauer Aff,
ECF No. 58-9). A&K responded to BANA's inquiry with a
letter stating “the nine-month super-priority is not
triggered until the beneficiary under the first deed of trust
forecloses, ” and that unless “all past due
obligations, plus collections costs and fees, ” are
paid, the foreclosure would proceed. (A&K Resp. Letter,
Ex. 2 to Miles Bauer Aff, ECF No. 58-9). A&K also
responded with a payment history report for the Property,
identifying the total amount owed. (Id.). Based upon
these records, BANA calculated what it determined to be the
HOA superpriority lien amount and sent A&K a check for
$720.00, which A&K rejected. (See Tender Letter,
Ex. 3 to Miles Bauer Aff, ECF No. 58-9); (see also
Confirmation of Receipt, Ex. 4 to Miles Bauer Aff).
proceeded with foreclosure and sold the Property to HOA for
$7, 330.53 on September 5, 2012. (See Foreclosure
Deed, ECF No. 58-10). HOA subsequently conveyed the Property
to SFR by a quitclaim deed, recorded on March 6, 2013.
(See Quitclaim Deed, ECF No. 58-13).
filed the instant action on March 16, 2016, asserting the
following causes of action arising from the HOA foreclosure
and subsequent sales of the Property: (1) quiet title; (2)
breach of NRS 116.1113; (3) wrongful foreclosure; and (4)
injunctive relief. (Id. ¶¶ 32-85). SFR
later filed a Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 38), and both BANA
and SFR filed competing summary-judgment Motions with respect
to BANA's claims, (ECF Nos. 58-59).
is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally
cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, and
although a court must take all factual allegations as true,
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are
insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly,
Rule 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. This standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
a district court may not consider any material beyond the
pleadings in a ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,
896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). “However,
material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint
may be considered.” Id. Similarly,
“documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint
and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in a
Ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Branch v.
Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). On a motion
to dismiss, a court may also take judicial notice of
“matters of public record.” Mack v. S. Bay
Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).
Otherwise, if a court considers materials outside of the
pleadings, the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion
for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United ...