United States District Court, D. Nevada
U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,
SUNRIDGE HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, LLC, et al., Defendants. SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, Counter/Cross-Claimant,
U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; SUZIE NGUYEN SU, Counter/Cross-Defendants.
M. Navarro, Chief United States District Court Judge.
before the Court is Plaintiff U.S. Bank, National
Association's (“Plaintiff's”) Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 73). SFR Investments Pool
1, LLC (“SFR”) and Sunridge Heights Homeowners
Association (“HOA”) (collectively
“Defendants”) filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 81, 82),
and Plaintiff filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 84, 85).
pending before the Court are Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment, (ECF Nos. 72, 74). Plaintiff filed
Responses, (ECF Nos. 79, 80); SFR filed a Response, (ECF No.
77), to HOA's Motion for Summary Judgment; and Defendants
filed Replies in support of their Motions for Summary
Judgment, (ECF Nos. 78, 83, 86).
case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real
property located at 2128 Horse Prairie Drive, Henderson,
Nevada 89052 (the “Property”). In 2004, Suzie
Nguyen Su (“Borrower”) financed a purchase of the
Property by way of loan in the amount of $567, 650.00 secured
by a deed of trust (“DOT”), for which DHI
Mortgage Company, Ltd. (“DHI”) served as the
original beneficiary. (See DOT, Ex. A-3 to SFR's
MSJ, ECF No. 74-1). DHI later assigned the DOT to BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP (“BAC”). (Assignment, Ex. A-9
to SFR's MSJ, ECF No. 74-1).
2010, upon Borrower's failure to pay all amounts due on
the Property, HOA through its agent Nevada Association
Services, Inc. (“NAS”) initiated foreclosure
proceedings. (Notice of Lien, Ex. E to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No.
73-5); (Notice of Default, Ex. F to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No.
73-6). In September of that year, BAC sent NAS a letter
requesting a calculation of the superpriority portion of
HOA's lien. (Request for Accounting, Ex. 1 to Miles Bauer
Aff., ECF No. 73-7). NAS responded with a payment history
report, from which BAC calculated nine months' worth of
common assessments. (Payment History Report, Ex. 2 to Miles
Bauer Aff., ECF No. 73-7). Accordingly, on November 5, 2010,
BAC sent NAS a check for $607.50, which NAS rejected. (Tender
Letter, Ex. 3 to Miles Bauer Aff., ECF No. 73-7); (see
also 30(b)(6) Dep. 64:15-65:20, Ex. H to Pl.'s MSJ,
ECF No. 73-8).
February of 2011, NAS proceeded with foreclosure proceedings
by recording a Notice of Foreclosure Sale. (Notice of Sale,
Ex. I to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 73-9). In July of that year,
BAC merged with Bank of America, National Association
(“BANA”). (Certificate of Merger, Ex. C. to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 73-3). With BANA as the DOT holder,
NAS recorded a second Notice of Foreclosure sale in December
of 2012. (Notice of Sale, Ex. J to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No.
January 11, 2013, NAS, on behalf of HOA, sold the Property
through a foreclosure sale. (Foreclosure Deed, Ex. K to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 73-11). That same day, BANA recorded
its assignment of the DOT to Plaintiff. (Assignment, Ex. D to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 73-4).
the foreclosure sale, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on
April 29, 2016, asserting four causes of action: (1) quiet
title with the requested remedy of declaratory relief; (2)
breach of Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”)
116.1113; (3) wrongful foreclosure; and (4) injunctive
relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-79, ECF No. 1). SFR then filed
an Answer, asserting counterclaims for quiet title, slander
of title, and injunctive relief against Plaintiff; as well as
crossclaims for quiet title and injunctive relief against
Borrower. (Answer ¶¶ 45-69, ECF No. 25).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine
if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a
reasonable factfinder could rely to find for the nonmoving
party. See Id. “The amount of evidence
necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough
‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties'
differing versions of the truth at trial.'”
Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th
Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). “Summary
judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a
verdict in the nonmoving party's favor.” Diaz
v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207
(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). A principal purpose of
summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323- 24. If the
moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary
judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the
nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). However, the nonmoving party “may not rely on
denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence,
through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show
that the dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps.,
Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and
“must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Orr
v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002)
(internal citations omitted). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence
of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
See Id. at 249-50.
moves for summary judgment with its quiet title claim on the
ground that BAC tendered payment to NAS prior to the
foreclosure sale and accordingly preserved Plaintiff's
DOT by extinguishing HOA's superpriority lien. (Pl.'s
MSJ 2:11-3:11, 6:10-9:3, ECF No. 73). Plaintiff also contends
that the DOT remains on the Property because the foreclosure
was conducted pursuant to an unconstitutional statutory
scheme, or, in the alternative, the Property's
foreclosure sale violated due process and was conducted under
unfair circumstances that warrant setting aside the sale on
equitable grounds. (Id. 2:11-3:11).
seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims by arguing
that Plaintiff's quiet title claim is time-barred, that
Plaintiff does not have standing to assert it claims, that
the foreclosure sale complied with NRS Chapter 116, that
Plaintiff cannot establish an equitable basis for setting
aside the sale, and that Plaintiff's constitutional
arguments fail based on recent case law. (HOA's MSJ
6:23-8:23, 10:8-16:26, ECF No. 72); (SFR's MSJ 8:3-16:5,
ECF No. 74); (SFR's Resp. to Pl.'s MSJ
(“SFR's Resp.”) 6:11-7:2, ECF No. 82). SFR
further contends that the Court should grant summary judgment
in its favor for its competing quiet title claim against
Plaintiff and Borrower. (SFR's MSJ 12:3-15:14, 17:6-12).
below discussion first addresses the statutory limitations
period applicable to Plaintiff's quiet title claim. Then,
it addresses Plaintiff's standing, the constitutionality
of the foreclosure, and ...