United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s
(“BANA”) motion for reconsideration. (ECF No.
61). Defendants Ridgeview Homeowners Association, Inc.
(“Ridgeview”) and A Scimitar LLC
(“Scimitar”) filed separate responses (ECF Nos.
70, 71), to which BANA replied (ECF No. 73).
action arises from a dispute over real property located at
1927 Scimitar Drive #32, Henderson, Nevada 89011 (“the
property”). (ECF No. 1).
and Sonya Diaz (“the borrowers”) purchased the
property on or about June 26, 2006. (ECF No. 37-1). The
borrowers financed the purchase with a loan in the amount of
$140, 000.00 from BANA. (ECF No. 37-2). BANA secured the loan
with a deed of trust, which names BANA as the lender and
beneficiary, and PRLAP, Inc. as the trustee. Id.
BANA currently holds all beneficial interest in the deed of
trust. See (ECF No. 37-5).
12, 2011, Ridgeview, through its agent defendant Nevada
Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”), recorded a
notice of delinquent assessment lien (“the lien”)
against the property for the borrowers' failure to pay
Ridgeview in the amount of $1, 753.80. (ECF No. 37-6). On
August 26, 2011, Ridgeview recorded a notice of default and
election to sell pursuant to the lien, stating that the
amount due was $2, 883.60 as of August 23, 2011. (ECF No.
attempt to exercise its right of redemption, BANA requested
from Ridgeview the superpriority amount of the lien. (ECF No.
37-10). Ridgeview did not reply to BANA's request.
Id. BANA, thereby, used a payoff ledger for a
different property in the same development to calculate the
superpriority amount as $1, 350.00, the sum of nine months of
assessments. Id. On December 1, 2011, BANA sent a
letter and a check in that amount to Ridgeview. Id.
The letter explained that the check was the sum of nine
months of common assessments and intended to pay off the
superpriority portion of the lien. Id. Ridgeview
rejected the check without explanation. See id.
March 19, 2014, Ridgeview recorded a notice of foreclosure
sale against the property. (ECF No. 37-9). On July 25, 2014,
Ridgeview sold the property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
to Scimitar in exchange for $11, 100.00. See (ECF
No. 37-11). On July 29, 2014, Ridgeview recorded the deed of
foreclosure with the Clark County recorder's office.
September 20, 2016, BANA initiated this action, asserting
four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment
against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against
Ridgeview and NAS; (3) wrongful foreclosure against Ridgeview
and NAS; and (4) injunctive relief against Scimitar. (ECF No.
1). On October 14, 2016, Scimitar filed counterclaims against
BANA for quiet title and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 12).
8, 2018, the court granted Ridgeview and Scimitar's
motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 36, 38), holding in
part that BANA's attempted tender was insufficient to
extinguish the superpriority portion of the lien. (ECF No.
55). On August 22, 2018, BANA filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal without prejudice of its claims against NAS. (ECF
No. 58). On that same day, BANA appealed. (ECF No. 59).
October 5, 2018, BANA filed a motion to amend its voluntary
dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(a). (ECF No. 62). The court
denied BANA's motion as the pending appeal divested the
court of jurisdiction to adjudicate BANA's motion. (ECF
No. 63). On December 19, 2018, the Ninth Circuit remanded for
the limited purpose of considering BANA's Rule 60(a)
request. (ECF No. 64). Nine days later, BANA filed a motion
for reconsideration requesting that the court (1) amend the
notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(a) and (2)
issue an indicative ruling pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)(3). (ECF
motion for reconsideration “should not be granted,
absent highly unusual circumstances.” Marlyn
Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571
F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). “Reconsideration is
appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly
discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial
decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an
intervening change in controlling law.” School
Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1993); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
60(b) “permits a district court to reconsider and amend
a previous order, ” however “the rule offers an
extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests
of finality and conservation of judicial resources.”
Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir.
2003) (internal quotations omitted). A motion for
reconsideration is also an improper vehicle “to raise
arguments or present evidence for the first time when they
could reasonably have been raised earlier in
litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d