Bank of America, N.A. v. Pacific Legends Green Valley Owners' Association

          ORDER

         Presently before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s (“BANA”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 60). Defendants BFP Investments 3, LLC (“BFP”) filed a response (ECF No. 65), to which BANA replied (ECF No. 70).

         Also before the court is BFP's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 61). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 63), to which BFP replied (ECF No. 67).

         Also before the court is BANA's motion for leave to file supplemental authority. (ECF No. 74). BFP filed a response (ECF No. 75), to which BANA replied (ECF No. 76).

         I. Facts

         This action arises from a dispute over real property located at 75 N. Valle Verde Dr. #1025, Henderson, Nevada 89074 (“the property”). (ECF No. 1).

         Sven Steffen purchased the property on March 12, 2002. (ECF No. 61-4). On July 7, 2009, Steffen refinanced the property with a loan in the amount of $207, 994.00 from Security National Mortgage Company (“Security National”). (ECF No. 60-1). Security National secured the loan with a deed of trust, which names Security National as the lender, North American Title as the trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary as nominee for the lender and lender's successors and assigns. Id. The Federal Housing Authority (“FHA”) insured the deed of trust at origination. See id. BANA currently holds all beneficial interest in the deed of trust. (ECF No. 60-3).

         On January 3, 2012, defendant Pacific Legends Green Valley Owners' Association (“Pacific Legends”), through its agent defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien (“the lien”) against the property for Steffen's failure to pay Pacific Legends in the amount of $1, 863.63. (ECF No. 60-4). On February 24, 2012, Pacific Legends recorded a notice of default and election to sell pursuant to the lien, stating that the amount due was $3, 042.18 as of February 21, 2012. (ECF No. 60-5).

         On March 13, 2012, BANA requested a ledger from Pacific Legends so that BANA could determine the superpriority portion of the lien and tender payment of that amount. (ECF No. 60-6). Pacific Legends did not respond to BANA or otherwise provide information that would allow BANA to calculate the superpriority portion of the lien. See id. As a result, BANA never sent a check to Pacific Legends. See id.

         On June 4, 2014, Pacific Legends recorded a notice of trustee's sale against the property. (ECF No. 60-9). On August 22, 2014, Pacific Legends sold the property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to BFP in exchange for $19, 000.00. See (ECF No. 60-10). On August 25, 2014, Pacific Legends recorded the foreclosure deed with the Clark County recorder's office. Id.

         On July 8, 2016, BANA initiated this action, asserting four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against Pacific Legends and NAS; (3) wrongful foreclosure against Pacific Legends and NAS; and (4) injunctive relief against BFP. (ECF No. 1). On December 16, 2016, BFP filed an answer and cross/counterclaims, asserting two causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory relief against BANA and Steffen; and (2) injunctive relief against BANA and Steffen. (ECF No. 25).

         Now, BANA and BFP have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 60, 61). . . . . . .

         II. Legal Standard

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

         For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

         In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

         By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment ...