United States District Court, D. Nevada
C. MAHAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the
court's order entering summary judgment against plaintiff
Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA"). Pursuant to the
Ninth Circuit's directive, the court hereby adjudicates
this matter consistent with Bank of America, N.A. v.
Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Association, No.
17-15796, 2019 WL 1461317 (9th Or. April 3, 2019)
action arises from a dispute over real property located at
10342 Hanky Panky Street, Las Vegas, Nevada 89131 (the
"property”). (ECF No. 1).
and Jennifer Glover (the "Glovers") purchased the
property on or about July 21, 2009. See (ECF No.
57-1). The Glovers financed the purchase with a loan in the
amount of $406, 978.00 from DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd
("DHI"). Id. GHI secured the loan with a
deed of trust, which names GHI as the lender, DHI Title of
Nevada as the trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary as
nominee for the lender and lender's successors and
assigns. Id. On March 6, 2012, BANA acquired all
beneficial interest in the deed of trust via an assignment,
which BANA recorded with the Clark County recorder's
office. (ECF No. 57-3).
August 29, 2013, defendant Log Cabin Ponderosa Homeowners
Association ("Log Cabin"), through its agent
defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.
("NAS"), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment
lien ("the lien") against the property for the
Glovers' failure to pay Log Cabin in the amount of $1,
757.62. (ECF No. 57-4). On October 11, 2013, Log Cabin
recorded a notice of default and election to sell pursuant to
the lien, stating that the amount due was $2, 689.28 as of
October 8, 2013. (ECF No. 57-5).
attempt to exercise its right of redemption, BANA requested
from Log Cabin the superpriority amount of the lien. (ECF No.
57-7). In response, Log Cabin provided a payoff ledger of the
Glovers' total amount due from November 2012 to March
2014. Id. The payoff ledger shows an outstanding
balance of $3, 054.72 but does not state what portion of the
balance constitutes the superpriority portion of the lien.
Id. The ledger also does not include charges for
maintenance and nuisance abatement. Id. The ledger
does state, however, that Log Cabin's monthly assessment
against the property was $58.00. Id.
used Log Cabin's ledger to calculate the superpriority
amount as $522.00, the sum of nine months of common
assessments. Id. On March 13, 2014, BANA sent a
letter and a check for that amount to Log Cabin. Id.
The letter explained that the check was the sum of nine
months of common assessments and intended to pay off the
superpriority portion of the lien. Id. Log Cabin
rejected the payment without explanation. Id.
25, 2014, Log Cabin recorded a notice of foreclosure sale
against the property. (ECF No. 57-6). On August 22, 2014, Log
Cabin sold the property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to
defendant MRT Assets, LLC ("MRT") in exchange for
$62, 000.00. (ECF No. 57-8). On August 25, 2014, MRT recorded
the foreclosure deed with the Clark County recorder's
office. Id. On February 10, 2015, defendant TRP Fund
V, LLC ("TRP") acquired all beneficial interest in
the property via a quitclaim deed. (ECF No. 57-10).
February 25, 2016, BANA initiated this action, asserting four
causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment
against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against
NAS and Log Cabin; (3) wrongful foreclosure against NAS and
Log Cabin; and (4) injunctive relief against TRP. (ECF No.
1). On March 2, 2016, TRP filed an answer, counterclaim and
third- party complaint to quiet title. (ECF No, 6).
April 18, 2017, the court entered summary judgment, holding
that the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust.
(ECF No. 73). That same day, the clerk entered judgment. (ECF
17, 2017, BANA appealed to the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 75).
On April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the
court's April 18, 2017, order and directed the court to
commence proceedings consistent with Arlington. (ECF
No. 82). Now, the court adjudicates the merits of this
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. "When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material ...