United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
before the Court is the Motion to Amend Order and Judgment,
(ECF No. 133), filed by Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.
(“BANA”). Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 135), and BANA
filed a Reply, (ECF No. 136). For the reasons discussed herein,
BANA's Motion is DENIED.
case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real
property located at 6018 Tea Light Court, Las Vegas, Nevada
89113 (the “Property”). BANA's Motion to
Amend concerns the Court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Defendants SFR and SBH2 Homeowners Association
(“HOA”) and against BANA. The Court will briefly
recite that facts relevant to deciding the present Motion.
2007, Gregg and Frances Escamilla (“Borrowers”)
purchased the Property by way of a $347, 274.00 loan from
BANA. (Deed of Trust, ECF No. 109-1). BANA secured the loan
with a deed of trust, which continued to encumber the
Property until the foreclosure sale at issue in this case.
(Id.). On June 15, 2010, HOA, through its agent
Nevada Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”),
initiated foreclosure proceedings on the Property following
Borrowers' default on their payment obligations.
(See Statutory Notices, ECF Nos. 109-7, 109-8,
109-10). In an effort to preserve its first-position lien,
BANA sent NAS a letter requesting the amount necessary to
satisfy HOA's superpriority lien. (See Letter of
Inquiry, Ex. 1 to Miles Bauer Aff., ECF No. 109-16). NAS
failed to respond to BANA's correspondence and proceeded
with foreclosure. (See Foreclosure Deed, ECF No.
109-18). The sale took place on January 11, 2013, at which
SFR purchased the Property for $17, 500.00. (Id.).
filed this action on April 27, 2015, primarily seeking a
declaration that its deed of trust remains a valid
encumbrance on the Property. BANA brought the following
claims against various parties involved in the foreclosure
and subsequent sale of the Property: (1) quiet title with a
requested remedy of declaratory relief against all
Defendants; (2) wrongful foreclosure against HOA; (3) breach
of NRS 116.1113 against HOA; and (4) injunctive relief
against SFR. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-64, ECF
September 29, 2018, the Court issued its Order, (ECF No.
130), resolving BANA, SFR, and HOA's respective
summary-judgment motions, (ECF Nos. 105, 109, 113). The Court
denied BANA's motion as to all causes of action and
granted Defendants summary judgment on BANA's claims.
(See Order 14:1-8, ECF No. 130). The Court found
that BANA's letter of inquiry to NAS, offering to pay the
yet-to-be-determined superpriority amount, did not constitute
a valid tender. (See Id. 8:17-9:12) (“Because
BANA only declared its willingness to pay and did not present
actual payment, there was no tender of the super priority
amount that would have prevented HOA from extinguishing
BANA's DOT through foreclosure.”). In doing so, the
Court rejected BANA's argument that NAS's lack of
response to the letter of inquiry excused BANA from its
obligation to pay off the HOA superpriority lien.
(Id. 9:5-8). The Court also found BANA's
equitable arguments unavailing, concluding the record did not
support a finding that the foreclosure process was
sufficiently unfair to justify voiding the sale.
(Id. 10:21-13:15). Following the Court's Order,
the clerk of court entered judgment in favor of HOA and SFR,
and against BANA. (Clerk's J., ECF No. 131).
thereafter, BANA filed the present Motion requesting that the
Court reconsider its ruling with respect to its claims
against HOA for wrongful foreclosure and breach of NRS
116.1113. (See Mot. to Am. 2:1-11, ECF No. 133).
BANA also urges reconsideration of the Court's conclusion
that BANA's letter of inquiry, coupled with NAS's
refusal to respond, did not excuse BANA from its duty to
satisfy HOA's superpriority lien. (Id. 2:12-17,
4:7-11:12); (see also Notice of Suppl. Authority,
ECF No. 137-1) (citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Thomas
Jessup, LLC Series VII, 435 P.3d 1217 (Nev. 2019)).
Rule 59(e), district courts have considerable discretion when
considering a motion to amend a judgment. Turner v.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe. R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058,
1063 (9th Cir. 2003). There are four grounds upon which a
Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is necessary
to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment
is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered
evidence or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is
necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an
intervening change in controlling law. Id. Motions
under this Rule “should not be granted, absent highly
unusual circumstances.” 389 Orange St. Partners v.
Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1995). A motion to
amend judgment is not a vehicle permitting an unsuccessful
party to reiterate arguments previously presented. Taylor
v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, a
“Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments
or present evidence for the first time when they could
reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”
Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).
moves the Court to reconsider its Order granting summary
judgment in favor of HOA and against BANA on the wrongful
foreclosure and breach of NRS 116.1113 claims. (See
Mot. to Am. 2:1-11, ECF No. 133). Alternatively, BANA
requests reconsideration of the Court's ruling that
BANA's attempt to pay off the HOA superpriority lien was
insufficient to constitute a valid tender or justify a
finding of futility. (Id. 2:12-17, 4:7-11:12).
Court begins with BANA's arguments concerning the impact
of its purported tender, followed by discussion of BANA's
claims against HOA.