Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Casoleil Homeowners Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

June 25, 2019

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiff, [1]



         I. SUMMARY

         This matter arises from a non-judicial foreclosure sale ("HOA Sale") of real property located at 4892 Bougainvillea Drive, Sparks, NV 89436 ("Property") to satisfy a homeowners' association lien. Before the Court are Defendant Casoleil Homeowners Association's ("HOA") motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s ("BANA") motion for the same. The dispositive issue is whether BANA's first deed of trust was protected from being extinguished by the HOA Sale due to 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) ("Federal Foreclosure Bar") acting to protect the Federal National Mortgage Association's ("Fannie Mae") property interest. Because the Court finds the Federal Foreclosure Bar applies here, the Court will grant BANA's motion and therefore denies the HOA's motion.[2]


         The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

         In October 2006, Steven M. Tyler and Melva D. Tyler (“Borrowers”) obtained a loan (“Loan”) from American Home Mortgage (“Lender”) for $236, 627.00. (E.g., ECF No. 76-2 at 2-4.) The Loan was secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”) recorded against the Property and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) was the nominee beneficiary on the DOT. (Id.) The DOT also granted Lender a security interest in the Property to secure the repayment of the Loan. (Id.)

         BANA has provided the affidavit of Fannie Mae's Assistant Vice President, Graham Babin, and Fannie Mae's business records accompanying Babin's declaration, evidencing that Fannie Mae purchased the Loan in December 2006, and thereby obtained the Lender's property interest in the DOT. (ECF No. 76-3 at 3-4, 7; see also ECF No. 76-4 at 3 (Barnfield declaration also provided that “Fannie Mae acquired ownership of the Loan in or about December 2006 and has owned the Loan ever since”).)

         On August 28, 2009, MERS, as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns, recorded an assignment of the DOT to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (“BAC”). (ECF No. 76-5.) BAC merged into BANA on July 1, 2011. (ECF No. 76-6.) A June 24, 2013 recording reflects that BANA assigned the DOT to Fannie Mae. (ECF No. 76-7.)

         The Borrower failed to pay HOA assessments. The HOA, through its agent Alessi & Koenig, LLC (“Alessi”), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien on November 30, 2010, and a notice of default and election to sell on February 24, 2011. (ECF Nos. 76-12, 76-13.) A trustee's deed upon sale was recorded on June 27, 2013, providing that the Property was sold at the HOA Sale to Defendant LVDG, LLC d/b/a LVDG Series 109 (“LVDG”) for $16, 000 on June 6, 2013 (ECF No. 76-14). On July 22, 2015, a Grant Deed from LVDG to Thunder Properties Inc. (“Thunder”) was recorded. (ECF No. 76-15.)

         Fannie Mae maintained ownership of the Loan at the time of the HOA Sale. (ECF No. 76-3 at 3-4, 7; see also ECF No. 76-4 at 3.) BANA was Fannie Mae's loan servicer at that time and the current servicer of the Loan. (ECF No. 76-7; ECF No. 76-3 at 4, 7-17.)[3]

         BANA's predecessor-U.S. Bank-filed the Complaint on June 6, 2016, asserting the following five claims for relief: (1) declaratory relief under the Federal Foreclosure Bar against all Defendants; (2) quiet title under the Federal Foreclosure Bar against LVDG and Thunder; (3) breach of NRS § 116.1113 against the HOA and Alessi; (4) wrongful foreclosure against the HOA and Alessi; and (5) injunctive relief against Thunder. (ECF No. 1.)


         “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

         The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.