United States District Court, D. Nevada
MIRANDA M. DU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
dispute arises from the foreclosure sale of property to
satisfy a homeowners' association lien. Before the Court
are Defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 7712 Beach Falls'
(“Saticoy”) and Plaintiff PHH Mortgage
Corporation's (“PHH”) cross-motions for
summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 71, 72.) The Court has reviewed
Defendant Desert Creek Owners Association, Inc.'s
(“HOA”) responses. (ECF Nos. 75, 76.) No. other
responses were filed, nor were any replies filed. For the
following reasons, the Court grants Saticoy's motion and
denies PHH's motion. The Court also dismisses the
HOA's third party complaint as moot.
following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
E. Vega (“Borrower”) purchased residential
property (“Property”) located within the HOA at
7712 Beach Falls Court, Las Vegas, Nevada in 2010 with a loan
(“Loan”) secured by a first deed of trust
(“DOT”). (ECF No. 71-3 at 2-3, 14.) The DOT was
assigned to PHH by assignment recorded April 27, 2012. (ECF
No. 71-4 at 3.)
recorded the following notices against the Property between
June and December 2013: notice of delinquent assessment lien
(ECF No. 71-5 at 2); notice of default and election to sell
(ECF No. 71-7 at 2-3); and notice of trustee's sale (ECF
No. 71-9 at 2-3).
recorded a foreclosure deed (“Foreclosure Deed”)
against the Property on January 16, 2014. (ECF No. 72-7 at
2.) The Foreclosure Deed indicates that the HOA sold the
Property to Saticoy for $40, 500 on January 3, 2014
(“HOA Sale”). (Id.)
asserts claims for declaratory relief, quiet title, and
unjust enrichment against Saticoy in the First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 7 at 6-10.) PHH does
not assert claims against the HOA or the Borrower. In the
prayer for relief, PHH primarily seeks a declaration that the
HOA Sale is void and did not extinguish the DOT.
(Id. at 11.)
filed a third party complaint against NAS asserting claims
for express and implied indemnity, contribution,
apportionment, breach of contract, and declaratory relief.
(ECF No. 18 at 10-14.)
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric, 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330
(1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a
sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Where
reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue,
however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See
Id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary
to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to
require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing
versions of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp.
v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting First Natl Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment
motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser
Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d
1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden
shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the
pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285
F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence
in support of the plaintiff's position will be
insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
“when parties submit cross-motions for summary
judgment, ‘[e]ach motion must be considered on its own
merits.'” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty.,
Inc. v. Riverside Two,249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
2001) (citations omitted) (quoting William W. Schwarzer,
et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary
Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 499 (Feb. 1992)). “In
fulfilling its duty to review ...