United States District Court, D. Nevada
J. DAWSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court for consideration is defendants Clark County
School District's (“CCSD”) and Keith
France's (“France”) Joint Motion to Dismiss
(#15). Plaintiff Shaun Taylor (“Taylor”) filed a
response in opposition (#20) to which defendants replied
Shaun Taylor, is black/African American and was an employee
of CCSD. Compl. 2, ECF No. 1. She was an employee at the
school where France was the principal. Id. On April
26, 2017, despite her taking a sick day, France wrote Taylor
up because she did not proctor an exam. Id. About a
month later, on May 22, 2017, Taylor reported to her
supervisor, Ms. McIntyre, that France had discriminated
against her on the basis of her race. Id. Taylor
states that she cried during that report. Id.
30, 2017, Taylor's union representative informed she and
France that Taylor was approved for leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) because of her
stress and anxiety. Id. at 3. The union
representative advised Taylor that she could only be on
school property during her FMLA release time if it was for
activities related to her son who attended the school.
Id. On June 1, 2017, while picking her son up from
school, Taylor had a panic attack, and because she felt
dizzy, Taylor “reached out and held onto” Ms.
McIntyre. Id. According to Taylor, France later made
statements that Taylor grabbed and shook Ms. McIntyre during
this event. Id. While the paramedics tended to
Taylor, a security officer attempted to read her a trespass
warning; however, the security officer stopped upon noticing
that the panic attack had rendered her incoherent.
Id. at 3. Taylor was hospitalized for that panic
attack. Id. at 5. The following day, France sent an
email to Taylor with a trespass notice, but Taylor claims
that she did not check her email that contained the notice
until July 27, 2017. Id.
evening of June 3, 2017, Taylor entered the school to
retrieve her personal belongings. Id. In response,
France filed a police report against Taylor for trespass,
however the charges were eventually dismissed. Id.
at 4. Taylor requested and was granted a transfer to a
different school because of France's alleged harassment.
Id. After her transfer, France sent a representative
to serve Taylor with disciplinary documents at her new
school. Id. According to Taylor, France also alluded
to her lack of fitness to teach. Id. at 7.
August 24, 2017, Taylor filed her Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Employment
Discrimination Complaint and requested a Right to Sue letter.
Id. at 4. The Right to Sue letter was mailed on
April 3, 2018, but was returned to the post office on April
10, 2018, for non-delivery. Id. According to Taylor,
she received the Right to Sue letter on April 12, 2018, and
then commenced this action on July 11, 2018. Id. at
may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require
detailed factual allegations, it demands more than mere
“labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Thus, “[to] survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint;
however, legal conclusions or mere recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Id. at 678. Second, a district court must consider
whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a
plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is
facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges
facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
Id. at 678.
where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
“alleged-but it has not show[n]-that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, when the claims in a
complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to
plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. Moreover, “[a]ll allegations of
material fact in the complaint are taken as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d
1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996).
brings six total causes of action before the Court. Her
claims divide into two groups: claims against both CCSD and
France and claims against France individually. Taylor first
alleges Title VII Racial Discrimination, Title VII
Retaliation, and FMLA Discrimination against CCSD and France.
She then alleges abuse of process, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) against France alone. The parties agree
that Taylor's FMLA claim is not the subject of this
motion, and the Court will not discuss it at this time. That
leaves Taylor's Title VII claims, her abuse of process
claim, her defamation claim, and her IIED claim for this
Title VII ...