United States District Court, D. Nevada
R. HICKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court are numerous motions filed by both
plaintiff/counterdefendant Rimini Street, Inc.,
(“Rimini”) and defendants/counterclaimants Oracle
International Corp. and Oracle America, Inc. (collectively
“Oracle”). This order will resolve all the
non-summary judgment related motions pending before the
Motions to Seal
are currently 26 motions to seal pending before the
undersigned. Oracle has filed 11 motions to seal (ECF Nos.
873, 885, 903, 928, 1023, 1080, 1133, 1140, 1141, 1148,
1178), and Rimini has filed 15 motions to seal (ECF Nos. 912,
926, 957, 973, 984, 1003, 1034, 1082, 1154, 1163, 1186, 1194,
1214, 1219). The parties seek to seal numerous exhibits
attached to substantive filings and the portions of their
summary judgment briefs that refer to those exhibits.
is a general presumption that court records should be open
and accessible to the public. Hagestad v. Tragesser,
49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). With non-dispositive
motions, this presumption is automatically overcome by a
showing that the material to be filed under seal is being
done so pursuant to a valid protective order. Foltz v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2003) (citing Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v.
General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
2002)). In Foltz, however, the Ninth Circuit held
that when parties seek to seal documents related to
dispositive motions, the presumption is not automatically
overcome, and the Court must balance the equities to
determine whether the documents should be sealed.
Id. at 1136. For exhibits to dispositive motions,
the Court must weigh the “public interest in
understanding the judicial process” with “whether
disclosure of the material could result in improper use of
the material for scandalous or libelous purposes or
infringement upon trade secrets.” Hagestad, 49
F.3d at 1434 (citing EEOC v. Erection Co., Inc., 900
F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990)). The party seeking to have the
information sealed must articulate “compelling
reasons” as to why the Court should seal the documents.
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d
1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006).
Court has reviewed the motions to seal and the underlying
documents, and it finds that the exhibits and portions of the
summary judgment briefs addressing them should be sealed. The
information Oracle seeks to seal mostly consists of
confidential financial and pricing information, business and
internal development strategies, and information regarding
its individually-negotiated customer licenses. Many of the
exhibits it seeks to seal identify customers by name and
detail Oracle's business relationship with them,
including the terms of the specific software license
agreement between Oracle and the customer. The information
Rimini seeks to seal is largely the same, consisting mostly
of information detailing its relationships with its
customers. The public does not have a strong interest in
learning about the specific agreements between the parties
and their customers because it is largely not relevant to
this case; at issue here is whether Rimini has infringed on
Oracle's copyrights. Revealing this customer information
would likely harm both Oracle and Rimini's competitive
standing by allowing competitors and customers a glimpse into
their negotiation strategies, which is a compelling reason to
keep it under seal. Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler
Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016).
Additionally, the third parties not involved in this
litigation would be placed at a competitive disadvantage (for
the same reason) if information regarding their confidential
business dealings was made public. See Music Group
Macao Commercial Offshore Limited v. Foote, 2015 WL
3993147, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (invasion of a third
party's privacy interest is a “compelling
reason” for filing a document under seal). The Court
also notes that the parties have filed redacted versions of
all the sealed motions in the public record, which limits the
harm done to the public.
Court will accordingly grant all the motions to seal.
Oracle's 17 U.S.C. §410(c) Motion
first substantive motion requests that the Court exercise its
discretion and apply an evidentiary presumption of validity
to over three dozen of the copyrights at issue in this case.
(ECF No. 867 at 6). 17 U.S.C. §410(c) allows the Court
to deem certain certificates of copyright registration as
“prima facie evidence” of the validity of the
copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. Oracle
seeks to have the Court deem 39 of the 136 copyrights at
issue in this case prima facie evidence that it was the
lawful holder of those copyrights; the other 97 copyrights at
issue are already entitled to an assumption of validity
because they were registered within five years of their first
publication. 17 U.S.C. §410(c). Oracle also seeks to
prevent Rimini from challenging the validity of 17 of the 39
copyrights not afforded the automatic presumption because in
previous litigation in this Court, a jury, inter
alia, found that Rimini had infringed those 17
copyrights. (ECF No. 867 at 7). Rimini filed a motion of
non-opposition to Oracle's motion, but it noted that it
wished to reserve the right to overcome the prima facie
presumption of copyright validity at trial. (ECF No. 961 at
Court will grant Oracle's motion. Local Rule 7-2(d)
states that a failure of any party to contest a motion
constitutes consent to the granting of the motion. Because
Rimini explicitly did not oppose Oracle's motion and
instead reserved argument for trial, the Court will apply the
§410(c) presumption of validity to the following 22
copyrights: (1) TX 7-095-798; (2) TX 8-151-290; (3) TX
6-541-029; (4) TX 6-541-047; (5) TX 8-060-246; (6) TX
8-060-225; (7) TX 8-060-232; (8) TX 8-060-249; (9) TX
8-060-264; (10) TX 8-060-259; (11) TX 8-060-258; (12) TX
8-060-255; (13) TX 8-108-902; (14) TX 8-108-914; (15) TX
8-108-944; (16) TX 8-108-891; (17) TX 8-108-968; (18) TX
8-108-961; (19) TX 8-108-850; (20) TX 8-108-924; (21) TX
7-781-659; (22) 7-781-641.
Court also finds that issue preclusion prevents Rimini from
relitigating whether Oracle is the valid copyright holder of
the other 17 copyrights at issue. Those are: (1) TX
7-065-376; (2) TX 7-065-381; (3) TX 7-063-688; (4) TX
7-065-319; (5) TX 7-063-683; (6) TX 7-063-668; (7) TX
7-077-447; (8) TX 7-077-451; (9) TX 7-092-406; (10) TX
7-092-603; (11) TX 7-092-583; (12) TX 7-092-617; (14) TX
6-541-033; (15) TX 6-941-989; (16) TX 6-941-988; (17) TX
6-941-990). The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents a party
from relitigating an issue already decided in a previous
action if: (1) there was a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the previous action; (2) the issue was
actually litigated in that action; (3) the issue was lost as
a result of a final judgment in that action; and (4) the
party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was present
in the previous action. U.S. Internal Revenue Serv. v.
Palmer, 207 F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 2000). All of these
elements are clearly met here. Oracle and Rimini were both
present in their current forms in the previous lawsuit,
Rimini had an opportunity to litigate the issue of
Oracle's ownership of the copyrights and did so through
summary judgment briefing before agreeing not to contest the
issue prior to trial. (See Oracle I, ECF No. 401 at
2-3). There was also a final judgment in the action when the
jury found Rimini liable for copyright infringement, and the
Ninth Circuit upheld the jury's findings on appeal.
(Oracle I, ECF No. 896); Oracle USA, Inc. v.
Rimini Street, Inc., 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018),
rev'd on other grounds, 139 S.Ct. 873 (2019).
Thus, the doctrine of issue preclusion applies, and Rimini
cannot contest the validity of the 17 copyrights listed above
Rimini's Motion to Strike
has also filed a motion to strike two exhibits attached to
two of Oracle's responses to its (Rimini's) motions
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 1151). Rimini seeks to strike
Exhibit B (ECF No. 1055-2) to Oracle's response to
Rimini's motion for partial summary judgment as to
“Certain Undisputed Process” and Exhibit 35 (ECF
No. 1000-2) to Oracle's response to Rimini's motion
for partial summary judgment on Oracle's already
adjudicated claims. (ECF No. 1151 at 3). Rimini states that
both Exhibit B and Exhibit 35 exceed Local Rule 7-3's
requirement that responses to motions for summary judgment be
no more than 30 pages in length, including statements of
fact; Exhibit B is 55 pages in length (for a total of 85
pages), and Exhibit 35 is 2 pages in length (for a total of
32 pages). Rimini argues that it is prejudiced by the
additional statements of fact because they “effectively
give Oracle an additional 57 pages to respond to Rimini's
motions, ” whereas Rimini limited to what was allowed
by the Local Rules. (ECF No. 1151 at 5). In response, Oracle
argues that it did not violate any of the Local Rules because
“[t]he inclusions of Exhibit B and Exhibit 35 to
describe additional disputes of fact to further
clarify the record and assist the Court does not violate the
letter or spirit of the rule.” (ECF No. 1182 at 4)
(emphasis in original).
Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or
any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). As Oracle notes in its response, motions
to strike are generally disfavored by the Court. D.E.
Shaw Laminar Portfolios, LLC v. Archon Corp., 570
F.Supp.2d 1262, 1271 (D. Nev. 2008). Whether to grant a
motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of the
District Court. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft
Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts
“often require a showing of prejudice by the moving
party” before granting a motion to strike.
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