United States District Court, D. Nevada
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOLDERS OF MLMI SURF TRUST, MORTGAGE LOAN ASSETBACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005- BC4, Plaintiff,
LEGENDS MAINTENANCE CORPORATION; BFP INVESTMENTS 6 LLC, Defendants. AND RELATED CLAIMS
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
dispute arises from the foreclosure sale (“HOA
Sale”) of real property located at 3915 Legend Hills
Street, Unit 102, Las Vegas, NV 89129
(“Property”) to satisfy a homeowners'
association lien. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Three motions are
currently pending before the Court.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant The Bank of New York Mellon Trust
Company, N.A., FKA The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.,
as Successor-in-Interest to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as
Trustee for the Holders of MLMI SURF Trust, Mortgage Loan
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-BC4
(“BoNYM”) and Cross-Defendant Nationstar Mortgage
LLC (“Nationstar”) move for summary judgment on
BoNYM's remaining claims against Defendant Legends
Maintenance Corporation (“Legends” or
“HOA”) and Defendant/Cross-claimant BFP
Investments 6 LLC (“BFP”) and on BFP's claims
against them. (ECF No. 68; ECF No. 1.) Legends moves for
summary judgment in its favor on BoNYM's remaining claim
against it-for quiet title/declaratory relief. (ECF No. 67;
see also ECF No. 40.) BFP also separately moves from
summary judgment on BoNYM's claims for quiet
title/declaratory relief and injunction and BFP's
counterclaims and cross claims for the same relief against
BoNYM and Cross-Defendants Nationstar and Katie E. Wilson
(“Wilson”). (ECF No. 66; ECF No. 30 at 9-16.) For
the following reasons, the Court grants BFP's and
Legends' motions for summary judgment (“MSJ”)
and denies BoNYM and Nationstar's joint motion.
following facts are undisputed unless otherwise
(“Borrower”) financed the purchase of the
Property within the HOA with a $181, 550.00 loan
(“Loan”) in July 2005. (ECF No. 68-1.) The Loan
was secured by a first deed of trust (“DOT”).
(See id.) The DOT was recorded as assigned to BoNYM
via an assignment of deed of trust recorded on May 31, 2012.
(ECF No. 68-2.)
Borrower failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA recorded
the following notices through its agent Nevada Association
Services, Inc. (“NAS”): (1) notice of delinquent
assessment lien on June 26, 2013, reflecting a total amount
due for the HOA's lien of $5, 399.99; and (2) notice of
default and election to sell on August 30, 2013, noting a
total due of $6, 851.08. (ECF Nos. 68-3, 68-4). The latter
notice was mailed via certified mail to Wilson, Nationstar
and BoNYM. (ECF No. 67-1 at 18-30.) There is no dispute as to
whether a tender was made to pay the superpriority amount of
the HOA's lien-there was none.
recorded a notice of HOA Sale on August 15, 2014, noting a
total due of $9, 929.41. (ECF No. 68-5.) This notice was also
mailed to Wilson, Nationstar and BoNYM, among others. (ECF
No. 67-1 at 35-39.) BFP purchased the Property at the HOA
Sale on September 5, 2014 for $27, 100.00. (ECF No.
Complaint, BoNYM asserted the following claims: (1) quiet
title/declaratory judgment against all Defendants; (2) breach
of NRS § 116.1113 against the HOA; (3) wrongful
foreclosure against the HOA; and (4) injunctive relief
against BFP. (ECF No. 1.) The Court dismissed the second and
third claims against the HOA without prejudice upon finding
those claims were subject to mediation under NRS §
38.310 (ECF No. 40.) Thus, the Court's MSJ inquiry
focuses only on BoNYM's remaining claims and BFP's
counterclaims and crossclaims seeking the same relief.
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there
is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden
shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the
pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252. Moreover, a court views all facts and draws all
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
initial matter, the Court addresses BFP's arguments that
BoNYM and Nationstar (collectively, “the Banks”)
lack Article III and prudential standing to assert
BoNYM's claims. (ECF No. 66 at 11-13; ECF No. 72 at 2,
6.) The Court will then address the merits of the
parties' arguments. Upon considering these matters, the
Court finds that while there is standing the Banks' legal
and equitable arguments fail. The Court therefore grants
summary judgment for BFP and Legends.
argues that the Banks (1) lack Article III standing to
challenge NRS § 116.3116 on due process grounds because
they received actual notice of the HOA Sale and (2) lack
prudential standing because they have not produced sufficient
evidence that they are entitled to enforce the Note and DOT.