United States District Court, D. Nevada
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS.
P. GORDON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The Bank of New York Mellon (BONY) sues to determine whether
a non-judicial foreclosure sale conducted by defendant The
Parks Homeowners Association (Parks) extinguished BONY's
deed of trust that encumbered property located at 6770
Cinnabar Coast Lane in North Las Vegas, Nevada. Parks
purchased the property via credit bid at the homeowners
association (HOA) foreclosure sale. Parks then transferred
the property to defendant Williston Investment Group LLC
(Williston), which is the current property owner.
asserts a single claim for declaratory relief, seeking a
declaration that the deed of trust remains an encumbrance on
the property. ECF No. 1. Williston counterclaims for
declaratory relief that it took title to the property free
and clear of the deed of trust. ECF No. 25.
moves for summary judgment, arguing that BONY's claim is
untimely, there is no basis to equitably set aside the sale,
the relevant statutes do not violate BONY's due process
rights, the sale is presumed valid, and Williston is a bona
fide purchaser. BONY responds that its complaint is timely
or, alternatively, that Williston is not entitled to judgment
on its counterclaim because the HOA sale was for a
subpriority lien only. BONY asserts that its servicer
tendered the superpriority amount before the HOA sale,
thereby extinguishing the superpriority lien.
separately moves for summary judgment on Williston's
counterclaim, arguing that the tender extinguished the
superpriority lien and that Williston is not a bona fide
purchaser. Williston responds that BONY has offered only
hearsay evidence to establish the superpriority amount.
Williston also argues that BONY has not presented evidence
that the tender was actually delivered to the HOA foreclosure
agent, and even if delivered, the tender attempt contained an
impermissible condition because it required the HOA to waive
its continuing right to nuisance abatement charges as part of
the superpriority lien. Williston also reiterates its
arguments from its own motion that the sale is presumed valid
and it is a bona fide purchaser.
replies that it has presented admissible business records to
show the superpriority amount, that there were no nuisance
abatement charges, and that its servicer tendered the
superpriority amount. BONY also argues that because the
tender extinguishes the superpriority lien as a matter of
law, Williston's alleged status as a bona fide purchaser
parties are familiar with the facts, and I will not repeat
them here except where necessary to resolve the motions. I
grant Williston's motion for summary judgment on
BONY's claim because that claim is untimely. I grant
BONY's motion on Williston's counterclaim because
Williston has not shown it is entitled to a quiet title
judgment in its favor where BONY's servicer tendered the
judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a), (c). A fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id.
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden
then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific
facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact
for trial. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212
F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000); Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am.,
Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018) (“To
defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce
evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact that could
satisfy its burden at trial.”). I view the evidence and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. James River Ins. Co. v. Hebert Schenk,
P.C., 523 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2008).
WILLISTON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
moves for summary judgment on BONY's quiet title claim,
asserting it is untimely. The HOA foreclosure sale took place
on February 1, 2013, the trustee's deed upon sale was
recorded on February 7, 2013, and BONY filed the complaint in
this matter on January 29, 2018. ECF Nos. 1; 33-6. I have
previously ruled that “the catchall four-year
limitation period in § 11.220 applies” to claims
by lienholders like BONY seeking to determine whether the
deed of trust survived an HOA foreclosure sale. Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Country Garden Owners Ass'n, No.
2:17-cv-01850-APG-CWH, 2018 WL 1336721, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar.
14, 2018). BONY's declaratory relief claim was filed more
than four years after BONY knew or should have known that its
deed of trust was in jeopardy. See Job's Peak Ranch
Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Douglas Cty., No. 55572, 2015
WL 5056232, at *3 (Nev. Aug. 25, 2015) (“If the facts
giving rise to the cause of action are matters of public
record then the public record gave notice sufficient to start
the statute of limitations running.” (quotation and
alteration omitted)). I therefore grant Williston's
motion because BONY's claim is time-barred.
BONY's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
moves for summary judgment on Williston's counterclaim to
quiet title. The party asserting a quiet title claim bears
the burden of proof “to prove good title in
himself.” Res. Grp., LLC as Tr. of E. Sunset Rd.
Tr. v. Nevada Ass'n Servs., Inc., 437 P.3d 154,
157-58 (Nev. 2019) (en banc) (quotation omitted). Thus,
“a plaintiff's right to relief [ultimately] . . .
depends on superiority of title.” Id.
(quotation omitted). A quiet title claim “does not
require any particular elements.” Id. Rather,
“each party must plead and prove ...