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Limcaco v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC

United States District Court, D. Nevada

April 18, 2019

ANGELICA CHRISTINA LIMCACO, Plaintiff,
v.
WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLC., a Nevada limited liability company, STEVE WYNN, an individual, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive and ROE CORPORATIONS 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

          ORDER

          MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         I. SUMMARY

         This is an employment discrimination case. Before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Steve Wynn and Defendant Wynn Las Vegas, LLC (“WLV”), respectively.[1] (ECF Nos. 23, 34.) Additionally before the Court are Plaintiff Angelica Christina Limcaco's requests for judicial notice. (ECF Nos. 39, 47, 54.)[2]

         The Court grants WLV's motion to dismiss in part and dismisses Plaintiff's federal claims as time-barred. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and will dismiss them without prejudice. The Court denies Mr. Wynn's motion to dismiss as moot, given that Plaintiff advances only state law claims against him. The Court denies Plaintiffs requests for judicial notice as improper surreplies and denies WLV's motions to strike as moot.

         II. BACKGROUND

         The following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 13) unless otherwise indicated.

         Plaintiff worked as a salon manager at WLV from June 13, 2005, until about June 2006. (Id. at 7, 10.) During that time, numerous co-workers reported to Plaintiff that Mr. Wynn sexually assaulted them. (See Id. at 8-10.) Plaintiff reported these incidents to her supervisor, Doreen Whennen, but Whennen failed to take action. (Id. at 2, 10.) Plaintiff took her concerns to the president of WLV, Andrew Pascal, and was terminated shortly thereafter, ostensibly because other employees complained about her. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff was unable to find work in Las Vegas and alleges that she was blacklisted. (Id. at 10, 23.) As a result, Plaintiff moved to Los Angeles. (Id. at 10.)

         Plaintiff was traumatized by these events and kept them to herself for roughly twelve years, until Mr. Wynn resigned from WLV's parent company. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff was concerned that she would face violence if she spoke out because she heard, among other things, that taking action against WLV would result in being terminated and blacklisted in the gaming industry and elsewhere; that Mr. Wynn bought a media publication in order to kill a story about himself and a woman who disappeared on a boat; and that Mr. Wynn “was more powerful than the police and that there may be people buried in the desert because of Mr. Wynn.” (Id. at 3, 9.) Plaintiff was also concerned because a former employee-Andrea-was terminated and seemingly disappeared after alleging sexual assault by Mr. Wynn. (Id. at 2-3.)

         About three months after Mr. Wynn resigned, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (“NERC”). (Id. at 4 (alleging that Mr. Wynn resigned on February 7, 2018), id. at 7 (alleging that NERC charge was filed on May 16, 2018).) A charge was then filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity /// Commission (“EEOC”) on May 23, 2018. (Id. at 7.) The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on June 11, 2018. (Id.)

         Plaintiff asserts four claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. (first through fourth claim) for retaliation and hostile work environment against WLV, and the following state law claims: retaliation in violation of NRS § 613.340 against WLV, wrongful termination in violation of public policy against WLV, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against WLV, civil conspiracy against all Defendants, interference with contractual relations against Mr. Wynn, and interference with economic advantage against Mr. Wynn. (ECF No. 13 at 13-23.)

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         A court may dismiss a plaintiffs complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citation omitted).

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiffs complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

         A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations concerning “all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (quoting Car ...


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