United States District Court, D. Nevada
MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
an employment discrimination case. Before the Court are two
motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Steve Wynn and
Defendant Wynn Las Vegas, LLC (“WLV”),
respectively. (ECF Nos. 23, 34.) Additionally before the
Court are Plaintiff Angelica Christina Limcaco's requests
for judicial notice. (ECF Nos. 39, 47, 54.)
Court grants WLV's motion to dismiss in part and
dismisses Plaintiff's federal claims as time-barred. The
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims and will dismiss them without
prejudice. The Court denies Mr. Wynn's motion to dismiss
as moot, given that Plaintiff advances only state law claims
against him. The Court denies Plaintiffs requests for
judicial notice as improper surreplies and denies WLV's
motions to strike as moot.
following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) (ECF No. 13) unless otherwise indicated.
worked as a salon manager at WLV from June 13, 2005, until
about June 2006. (Id. at 7, 10.) During that time,
numerous co-workers reported to Plaintiff that Mr. Wynn
sexually assaulted them. (See Id. at 8-10.)
Plaintiff reported these incidents to her supervisor, Doreen
Whennen, but Whennen failed to take action. (Id. at
2, 10.) Plaintiff took her concerns to the president of WLV,
Andrew Pascal, and was terminated shortly thereafter,
ostensibly because other employees complained about her.
(Id. at 10.) Plaintiff was unable to find work in
Las Vegas and alleges that she was blacklisted. (Id.
at 10, 23.) As a result, Plaintiff moved to Los Angeles.
(Id. at 10.)
was traumatized by these events and kept them to herself for
roughly twelve years, until Mr. Wynn resigned from WLV's
parent company. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff was
concerned that she would face violence if she spoke out
because she heard, among other things, that taking action
against WLV would result in being terminated and blacklisted
in the gaming industry and elsewhere; that Mr. Wynn bought a
media publication in order to kill a story about himself and
a woman who disappeared on a boat; and that Mr. Wynn
“was more powerful than the police and that there may
be people buried in the desert because of Mr. Wynn.”
(Id. at 3, 9.) Plaintiff was also concerned because
a former employee-Andrea-was terminated and seemingly
disappeared after alleging sexual assault by Mr. Wynn.
(Id. at 2-3.)
three months after Mr. Wynn resigned, Plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights
Commission (“NERC”). (Id. at 4 (alleging
that Mr. Wynn resigned on February 7, 2018), id. at
7 (alleging that NERC charge was filed on May 16, 2018).) A
charge was then filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
/// Commission (“EEOC”) on May
23, 2018. (Id. at 7.) The EEOC issued a right-to-sue
letter on June 11, 2018. (Id.)
asserts four claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. (first
through fourth claim) for retaliation and hostile work
environment against WLV, and the following state law claims:
retaliation in violation of NRS § 613.340 against WLV,
wrongful termination in violation of public policy against
WLV, intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) against WLV, civil conspiracy against
all Defendants, interference with contractual relations
against Mr. Wynn, and interference with economic advantage
against Mr. Wynn. (ECF No. 13 at 13-23.)
may dismiss a plaintiffs complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it demands more than “labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual
allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (internal citation omitted).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as
true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint;
however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported only by
conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.
Second, a district court must consider whether the factual
allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for
relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible
when the plaintiffs complaint alleges facts that allow a
court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. Where
the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Id. at 679. When the claims in a complaint have not
crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint
must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
complaint must contain either direct or inferential
allegations concerning “all the material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562
(quoting Car ...