United States District Court, D. Nevada
C. MAHAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the
court's order entering summary judgment against plaintiff
Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”). Pursuant to the
Ninth Circuit's directive, the court hereby adjudicates
this matter consistent with Bank of America, N.A. v.
Arlington West Twilight Homeowners Association, No.
17-15796, 2019 WL 1461317 (9th Cir. April 3, 2019)
action arises from a dispute over real property located at
6408 Hillside Brook Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89014 (the
“property”). (ECF No. 1).
Greco purchased the property on or about November 11, 2009.
(ECF No. 65). Greco financed the purchase with a loan in the
amount of $93, 279.00 from BANA. Id. BANA secured
the loan with a deed of trust, which names BANA as the
lender, Reconstrust Company, N.A. as the trustee, and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(“MERS”) as the beneficiary as nominee for the
lender and lender's successors and assigns. Id.
October 1, 2010, defendant Mountain Gate Homeowners'
Association (“Mountain Gate”), through its agent
defendant Hampton & Hampton Collections, LLC
(“H&H”), recorded a notice of delinquent
assessment lien (“the lien”) against the property
for Greco's failure to pay Mountain Gate in the amount of
$998.00. (ECF No. 65-3). On February 28, 2011, Mountain Gate
recorded a notice of default and election to sell pursuant to
the lien, stating that the amount due was $957.00 as of
February 24, 2011. (ECF No. 65-4).
March 14, 2012, BANA acquired all beneficial interest in the
deed of trust via an assignment, which BANA recorded with the
Clark County recorder's office. (ECF No. 65-2).
attempt to exercise its right of redemption, BANA requested
from Mountain Gate the superpriority amount of the lien. (ECF
No. 65-7). In response, Mountain Gate provided a payoff
ledger showing nine months of delinquent assessments from
January 2014 to September 2014. Id. The payoff
ledger also shows an outstanding balance of $765.00 and does
not include charges for maintenance and nuisance abatement.
used Mountain Gate's ledger to determine that the
superpriority amount was $765.00. Id. On April 10,
2014, BANA sent a letter and a check for that amount to
Mountain Gate. Id. The letter explained that the
check was the sum of nine months of common assessments and
intended to pay off the superpriority portion of the lien.
Id. Mountain Gate accepted the payment. Id.
9, 2014, Mountain Gate recorded a notice of trustee's
sale against the property. (ECF No. 65-6). On August 20,
2013, Mountain Gate sold the property in a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale to defendant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 6408
Hillside Brook (“Saticoy Bay”) in exchange for
$21, 100.00. (ECF No. 65-8). On December 3, 2013, Saticoy Bay
recorded the trustee's deed upon sale with the Clark
County recorder's office. Id.
March 10, 2016, BANA initiated this action, asserting four
causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment
against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against
H&H and Mountain Gate; (3) wrongful foreclosure against
H&H and Mountain Gate; and (4) injunctive relief against
Saticoy Bay. (ECF No. 1). On April 1, 2016, Saticoy Bay filed
a counterclaim against BANA for quiet tittle and declaratory
relief. (ECF No. 6).
April 12, 2017, the court entered summary judgment, holding
that the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust.
(ECF No. 83). That same day, the clerk entered judgment. (ECF
2, 2017, BANA appealed to the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 52). On
April 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded,
directing the court to commence proceedings consistent with
Arlington. (ECF No. 58). Now, the court adjudicates
the merits of this action.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set ...