United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, Chief Judge
before the Court is Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s
(“BANA's”) Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, (ECF No. 77). Defendants Aliante Master Association
(“HOA”) and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 80, 82), and
BANA filed a Reply, (ECF No. 87).
pending before the Court are the Motions for Summary
Judgment, (ECF Nos. 78, 79), filed by SFR and HOA. BANA filed
a Response, (ECF No. 81), and SFR and HOA filed Replies, (ECF
Nos. 88, 89).
reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in
part and DENIES in part BANA's
Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 77);
GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
79); and DENIES HOA's Motion for Summary
Judgment, (ECF No. 78).
case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real
property located at 6716 Sea Swallow Street, North Las Vegas,
Nevada 89084 (the “Property”). (See Deed
of Trust, Ex. A to BANA's Mot. Summ. J.
(“MSJ”), ECF No. 77-1). In 2007, Mary L. Slabon
(“Borrower”) purchased the Property by way of a
loan in the amount of $328, 000.00, secured by a deed of
trust (the “DOT”). (Id.). BANA was the
lender for Borrower's loan, and BANA recorded its
interest in the DOT on February 1, 2007. (See id.).
Borrower's failure to stay current on her payment
obligations, Nevada Association Services (“NAS”),
on behalf of HOA, initiated foreclosure proceedings by
recording a notice of delinquent assessment lien and a
subsequent notice of default and election to sell.
(See Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien, Ex. B to
BANA's MSJ, ECF No. 77-2); (Notice of Default, Ex. C to
BANA's MSJ, ECF No. 77-3).
April 7, 2014, the law firm Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom &
Winters LLP (“Miles Bauer”), on behalf of BANA,
sent a letter to NAS requesting a ledger identifying the
amount of HOA's superpriority lien. (See Request
for Accounting at 6-9, Ex. 1 to Miles Aff., ECF No. 77-4).
NAS responded with a ledger detailing the amount of HOA's
lien. (See Statement of Account, Ex. 2 to Miles
Aff., ECF No. 77-4). Based upon the monthly assessments
identified in the ledger, BANA calculated what it determined
to be HOA's superpriority lien, and delivered a check to
NAS for $421.74. (See Tender Letter, Ex. 3 to Miles
Aff., ECF No. 77-4).
the alleged tender, NAS proceeded with the foreclosure by
recording a notice of foreclosure sale and subsequently
foreclosing on the Property. (See Notice of Sale,
Ex. E to BANA's MSJ, ECF No. 77-5). On May 9, 2014, SFR
recorded a foreclosure deed, stating that it purchased the
Property for $26, 000. (Foreclosure Deed, Ex. F to BANA's
MSJ, ECF No. 77-6).
filed the instant Complaint on March 17, 2016, asserting the
following causes of action arising from the foreclosure and
subsequent sale of the Property: (1) quiet title; (2) breach
of NRS 116.1113; (3) wrongful foreclosure; and (4) injunctive
relief. (See Compl. ¶¶ 29-71). On May 14,
2016, SFR filed crossclaims and counterclaims against BANA
and Borrower, respectively, for quiet title and injunctive
relief. (See Answer 12:17-13:25, ECF No. 18).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving
party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must
be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving
party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To
establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth; it is to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of
the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Id. at 249-50.
moves for summary judgment on its quiet title and declaratory
relief claims, asserting that Bourne Valley Court Tr. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2296, 198 L.Ed.2d 726
(2017), compels the Court to hold that the HOA foreclosure
sale did not extinguish BANA' DOT. (BANA's MSJ
8:27-9:12, ECF No. 77). BANA alternatively argues that
summary judgment is warranted because BANA properly tendered
the superpriority HOA lien prior to the foreclosure sale,
thus eliminating the lien's superpriority status.
HOA oppose BANA's Motion on the following grounds:
Bourne Valley is not controlling authority; BANA
lacks standing to assert its quiet title claim; BANA did not
validly tender the superpriority amount prior to foreclosure;
and BANA is otherwise not entitled to an equitable remedy.
(SFR's Resp. 4:14-18:2, ECF No. 82); (HOA's Resp.
5:13-9:13, ECF No. 80).
seeks summary judgment in its favor on the basis that its
purchase of the Property extinguished all junior liens, and
alternatively, its status as a bona fide purchaser for value
safeguards its title to the Property. (SFR's MSJ.
17:9-26:14, ECF No. 79). Similarly, HOA requests summary
judgment, arguing the foreclosure sale was not
“wrongful” under Nevada law or principles of
equity, and that BANA received constitutionally sufficient
notice of the foreclosure, resulting in the sale's
extinguishment of BANA's DOT. (HOA's MSJ 5:13-12:27,
ECF No. 78).
Court's discussion below first addresses the
constitutionality of NRS Chapter 116, followed by BANA's
standing to bring this quiet title action.