United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Court
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
66), filed by Plaintiffs Federal Housing Finance Agency
(“FHFA”), in its capacity as Conservator for
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”), and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”). Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1,
LLC (“SFR”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 66),
Plaintiffs filed a Reply, (ECF No. 121). Also before the
Court is SFR's Motion for Summary judgment, (ECF No.
117). Plaintiffs filed a Response, (ECF No. 122), and SFR
filed a Reply, (ECF No. 126). For the reasons stated herein,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is
present action involves the interplay between Nev. Rev. Stat.
(“NRS”) § 116 and 12 U.S.C. § 4617 as
it relates to the parties' interests in 89 different
residential units located in Nevada (collectively “the
Properties”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 24). In
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs provide a brief history for the 89
properties, including the respective dates that they acquired
the deeds of trust (“DOTs”) for each of the
parcels. (See Id. ¶¶25-114); (See
also Charts, Ex. A to Pls.' MSJ, ECF No. 66-1);
(DOTS, Ex. E to Pls.' MSJ, ECF No. 66-5). In addition,
Plaintiffs provide the date that each property was subject to
a homeowners' association (“HOA”) foreclosure
sale under NRS 116. (Id.). Based on their claimed
ownership interest in the Properties, Plaintiffs seek to
quiet title and obtain declaratory relief that their DOTs
encumbering the Properties were not extinguished by the HOA
foreclosure sales. (Id. ¶¶ 117-136). The
parties now move for summary judgment on this
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving
party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must
be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving
party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To
establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth; it is to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of
the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Id. at 249-50.
move for summary judgment on their quiet tile and declaratory
relief claims, asserting that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)
(the “Federal Foreclosure Bar”) compels the Court
to find that the HOA's foreclosure sale did not
extinguish Plaintiffs' DOTs on the Properties. (Pls.'
MSJ 13:18-26, ECF No. 66). In turn, SFR raises five arguments
as to why the Federal Foreclosure Bar does not apply to this
action: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiffs'
claims are time-barred; (3) Plaintiffs fail to proffer
admissible evidence; (4) Plaintiffs lack a property interest;
and (5) FHFA consented to the extinguishment of the DOTs.
(See SFR's MSJ 5:2-7:11); (SFR's Resp.
6:5-25:27, ECF No. 115). The Court first addresses the
threshold questions of jurisdiction and statute of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Rem Jurisdiction
argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because four of the
properties listed in the Amended Complaint are already
subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the Eighth
Judicial District Court of Nevada. (SFR's MTD 5:22-7:22,
ECF No. 60). These four properties are identified as: (1)
Rolling Boulder; (2) Benezette Court; (3) Cimarron Cove; and
(4) Sea Rock Road. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47,
55, 62, 86). According to SFR, “[t]he ...