United States District Court, D. Nevada
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee for Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2007-3, Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2007-3, Plaintiff,
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, et al., Defendants.
M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Judge.
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
69), filed by Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
(“Plaintiff”). Defendants Heather Glen Homeowners
Association (“HOA”) and SFR Investments Pool 1,
LLC (“SFR”) (collectively
“Defendants”) filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 74, 76),
and Plaintiff filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 79, 80).
pending before the Court are the Motions for Summary
Judgment, (ECF Nos. 70, 71), filed by HOA and SFR,
respectively. Plaintiff filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 73, 75),
and Defendants filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 78,
reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED and Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED.
quiet title action arises from the non-judicial foreclosure
on real property located at 2835 Jamie Rose Street, Las
Vegas, Nevada 89135 (the “Property”).
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 49). On May 17,
2007, Robert L. Willhite and Robin M. Willhite
(“Borrowers”) took out a loan secured by a deed
of trust. (See Deed of Trust, Ex. 4 to Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 49-4). On October 7, 2011, Saxon Mortgage, Inc.,
the original beneficiary under the deed of trust, assigned
all beneficial interest in the deed to Plaintiff.
(See Assignment, ECF No. 49-5).
10, 2012, upon Borrowers' failure to pay all amounts due,
HOA initiated foreclosure proceedings through its agent,
Nevada Association Services, Inc (“NAS”), by
recording a notice of delinquent assessment lien.
(See Notice of Lien, ECF No. 49-8). NAS subsequently
recorded a notice of default and election to sell, followed
by a notice of foreclosure sale. (See Notice of
Default, ECF No. 49-9); (Notice of Foreclosure Sale, ECF No.
49-10). HOA conducted a public auction on August 23, 2013, at
which SFR purchased the Property for $39, 000. (See
Foreclosure Deed, ECF No. 49-11).
filed on February 2, 2018, (see ECF No. 1),
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 3, 2018,
bringing the following causes of action arising from the
foreclosure and subsequent sale of the Property: (1) quiet
title; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) wrongful foreclosure; (4)
negligence; (5) negligence per se; (6) injunctive relief; (7)
declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and the United
States Constitution; and (8) quiet title under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 72-143).
December 17, 2018, the parties filed their respective Motions
for Summary Judgment, (ECF Nos. 69-71).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine
if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323- 24. If the
moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary
judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the
nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. At summary
judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
seeks summary judgment on its quiet title claim, asserting
that its deed of trust continues to encumber the Property
because the foreclosure sale is void. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ.
J. (“MSJ”), ECF No. 69). According to Plaintiff,
the Court should invalidate the sale because it was in
contravention of NRS Chapter 116 and conducted pursuant to a
facially unconstitutional statute. (Id. 12:16-17:3).
Plaintiff further contends the sale should be equitably set
aside because it was sufficiently tainted with fraud,
oppression, and unfairness. (Id. 5:16-9:14).
moves for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff's
claims are time-barred, Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce
the deed of trust, and the foreclosure sale was validly
conducted, resulting in SFR taking title to the Property free
of Plaintiff's lien. (SFR's MSJ 1:5- 7:21, ECF No.
71). HOA also moves for summary judgment, arguing
Plaintiff's claims are untimely, Plaintiff failed to join
Borrowers as necessary parties to this action, and the
foreclosure sale's compliance with NRS Chapter 116
precludes Plaintiff from recovery on its remaining claims.
(HOA's MSJ 6:5-17:11, ECF No. 70).
to considering the merits of Plaintiff's claims, the
Court turns to the threshold questions of the timeliness of
causes of action, the constitutionality of NRS Chapter 116,
and Plaintiff's standing to bring the quiet title claim.
Statute of Limitations
to Defendants, each of Plaintiff's claims are barred by
their respective, applicable statutes of limitations.
(SFR's MSJ 4:22-24); (HOA's MSJ 6:2-9:17). Plaintiff
contends that its claims are timely when considered under the
proper limitation periods and trigger dates. (Pl.'s Resp.
to HOA's MSJ 4:9-18). The Court addresses the timeliness
of each claim in turn.
issue here is whether Plaintiff's quiet title claim is
subject to the five-year limitations period under NRS 11.070
and 11.080, or the four-year ...