United States District Court, D. Nevada
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, f/k/a COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, Plaintiff,
INSPIRADA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION; SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC; LEACH JOHNSON SONG & GRUCHOW, LTD., Defendants.
MIRANDA M. DU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
case arises from the foreclosure sale of property to satisfy
a homeowners' association lien. Before the Court are
three motions: (1) Defendant Inspirada Community
Association's (“HOA”) motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 109); (2) Plaintiff Bank of America,
N.A.'s (“BANA”) motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 110); and (3) Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1,
LLC's (“SFR”) motion for summary judgment
(ECF No. 111). The Court has reviewed the parties'
responses (ECF Nos. 115, 116, 117, 118) and replies (ECF Nos.
119, 120, 121). The Court also has reviewed the supplemental
briefs that the parties submitted (ECF Nos. 123, 124
(errata), 125) in response to the Court's order (ECF No.
122) allowing the parties to address the applicability of a
recent Nevada Supreme Court case to the facts of this case.
For the following reasons, the Court denies BANA's motion
for summary judgment, grants SFR's motion for summary
judgment, and denies the HOA's motion for summary
judgment as moot.
following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
and Kelly Schramm (“Borrowers”) purchased real
property (“Property”) within the HOA on
September 2, 2008, with a $281, 975 loan
(“Loan”). (ECF No. 110-1 at 2-3, 12.) The Loan
was evidenced by a note (“Note”) and secured by a
first deed of trust (“DOT”) that named Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as
the nominee beneficiary. (Id. at 3.) MERS assigned
the DOT to a company in May 2011 that merged into and with
BANA. (ECF No. 110-3 at 2 (assignment); ECF No. 110-4 at 2
(certificate of merger).)
Borrowers failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA recorded
the following notices through its agent, Leach Johnson Song
& Gruchow (“Leach”): (1) notice of delinquent
assessment on January 4, 2011 (ECF No. 110-5 at 2-3); and (2)
notice of default and election to sell on March 25, 2011 (ECF
No. 110-6 at 2-3).
asked Leach to identify the superpriority amount of the
HOA's lien and offered to pay that amount on April 22,
2011. (ECF No. 110-7 at 5-6.) Leach refused to provide any
account information to BANA unless BANA obtained the
Borrowers' authorization to release their assessment
account records. (Id. at 8.) The authorization form
required the Borrowers to consent to a $150 fee.
(Id. at 9.) It does not appear that BANA and Leach
communicated further after this.
recorded a notice of sale on May 14, 2012. (ECF No. 110-9 at
2-4.) The HOA sold the Property to SFR on April 18, 2013
(“HOA Sale”) for $14, 000. (ECF No. 110-10 at
asserts the following claims in its Complaint: (1) quiet
title/declaratory judgment against all Defendants; (2) breach
of NRS § 116.1113 against the HOA and Leach; (3)
wrongful foreclosure against the HOA and Leach; and (4)
injunctive relief against SFR. (ECF No. 1 at 6-14.)
asserted a counterclaim and crossclaim for quiet title and
injunctive relief against BANA and the Borrowers. (ECF No. 25
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there
is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable
minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however,
summary judgment is not appropriate. See Id. at
250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a
genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a
jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions
of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral
Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion,
a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement
Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103
(9th Cir. 1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden
shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the
pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting