United States District Court, D. Nevada
JOSEPH M. ANDERSON, Plaintiffs,
v.
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.
ORDER
ROBERT
C. JONES United States District Judge.
Before
the Court is the Plaintiffs last surviving claim, a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action, against the Defendant, Jethro Parks, for
retaliation for rights guaranteed by Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The case arises out
of an incident where the Defendant searched the Plaintiffs
prison cell and confiscated items purported to be used in
religious practices allegedly in retaliation towards the
Plaintiffs religion. Now pending is Magistrate Judge William
G. Cobb's Report and Recommendation
("R&R"). (ECF No. 205.) Because Judge Cobb
found that genuine disputes of material fact remained, he
recommended that the Court dismiss both Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 183) and Defendant's
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 193). The Court
finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and
adopts the R&R in part and rejects the R&R in part.
The Court dismisses the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and grants die Defendant's Renewed Morion for
Summary Judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
Court agrees with and adopts the R&R's summary of the
background of this case.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Retaliation
Under
the Ninth Circuit case law, a prisoner can state a claim for
retaliation for rights guaranteed by RLUIPA when five
elements are satisfied:
(1) An assertion mat a state actor took some adverse action
against an inmate
(2) because of
(3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such
action
(4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his rights, and
(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
correctional goal.
Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted).
"[A]
retaliation claim may assert an injury no more tangible than
a chilling effect on [the exercise of the plaintiffs]
rights." Gomez v. Vernon,255 F.3d 1118, 1127
(9th Cir. 2001), citing Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d
265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997). "[T]he mere threat of harm can
be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out
because the threat itself can ...