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The Bank of New York Mellon v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 20, 2019

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, Plaintiff(s),
v.
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, Defendant(s).

          ORDER

         Presently before the court is defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC's (“SFR”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”) filed a response (ECF No. 34), to which SFR replied (ECF No. 35).

         Also before the court is defendant Shadow Crossings Homeowner's Association's (“Shadow Crossings”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 37). BNYM and SFR filed separate responses (ECF Nos. 39, 40), to which Shadow Crossings filed separate replies (ECF Nos. 41, 42).

         I. Facts

         This action arises from a dispute over real property located at 6549 Raven Hall Street, North Las Vegas, Nevada 89084 (“the property”). (ECF Nos. 1, 31).

         On or about December 12, 2006, Daniel and Toni O'Neill (the “O'Neills”) purchased the property. (ECF No. 31). The O'Neills financed the purchased with a loan in the amount of $216, 000.00 from Fieldstone Mortgage Company (“Fieldstone”). Id. Fieldstone secured the loan with a deed of trust, which it recorded with the Clark County recorder's office on December 19, 2006. Id. On June 9, 2011, BNYM acquired all beneficial interest in the deed of trust via an assignment, which BNYM recorded with the Clark County recorder's office. Id.

         On May 6, 2010, Shadow Crossings, through its agent, recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien (“the lien”) against the property for the O'Neills' failure to pay Shadow Crossings in the amount of $1, 175.00. Id. On June 29, 2010, Shadow Crossings recorded a notice of default and election to sell pursuant to the lien. Id.

         On August 23, 2012, Shadow Crossings recorded a notice of foreclosure sale against the property. Id. On October 19, 2012, Shadow Crossings sold the property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to SFR in exchange for $8, 600.00. Id. and on October 25, 2012, recorded the deed of foreclosure. Id.

         On February 15, 2017, BNYM initiated this action. (ECF No. 1). In its amended complaint, BNYM asserts two quiet title claims. (ECF No. 31). Now, SFR and Shadow Crossings move to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 33, 37).

         II. Legal Standard

         A court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Ci P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Ci P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

         “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (citation omitted).

         In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.

         Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.

         Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has “alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the line from ...


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