United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is defendant SFR Investments Pool 1,
LLC's (“SFR”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
33). Plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”)
filed a response (ECF No. 34), to which SFR replied (ECF No.
before the court is defendant Shadow Crossings
Homeowner's Association's (“Shadow
Crossings”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 37). BNYM and
SFR filed separate responses (ECF Nos. 39, 40), to which
Shadow Crossings filed separate replies (ECF Nos. 41, 42).
action arises from a dispute over real property located at
6549 Raven Hall Street, North Las Vegas, Nevada 89084
(“the property”). (ECF Nos. 1, 31).
about December 12, 2006, Daniel and Toni O'Neill (the
“O'Neills”) purchased the property. (ECF No.
31). The O'Neills financed the purchased with a loan in
the amount of $216, 000.00 from Fieldstone Mortgage Company
(“Fieldstone”). Id. Fieldstone secured
the loan with a deed of trust, which it recorded with the
Clark County recorder's office on December 19, 2006.
Id. On June 9, 2011, BNYM acquired all beneficial
interest in the deed of trust via an assignment, which BNYM
recorded with the Clark County recorder's office.
6, 2010, Shadow Crossings, through its agent, recorded a
notice of delinquent assessment lien (“the lien”)
against the property for the O'Neills' failure to pay
Shadow Crossings in the amount of $1, 175.00. Id. On
June 29, 2010, Shadow Crossings recorded a notice of default
and election to sell pursuant to the lien. Id.
August 23, 2012, Shadow Crossings recorded a notice of
foreclosure sale against the property. Id. On
October 19, 2012, Shadow Crossings sold the property in a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale to SFR in exchange for $8,
600.00. Id. and on October 25, 2012, recorded the
deed of foreclosure. Id.
February 15, 2017, BNYM initiated this action. (ECF No. 1).
In its amended complaint, BNYM asserts two quiet title
claims. (ECF No. 31). Now, SFR and Shadow Crossings move to
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 33, 37).
may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Ci P.
12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a]
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Ci P. 8(a)(2);
Bell Atlantic Corp. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it demands “more than labels and
conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (citation omitted).
Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step
approach district courts are to apply when considering
motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all
well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however,
legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Id. at 678-79. Mere recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 678.
the court must consider whether the factual allegations in
the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allow the court
to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678.
the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
“alleged-but not shown-that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not
crossed the line from ...