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Bank of America, N.A. v. Peccole Ranch Community Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 19, 2019

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, F\K\A COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, Plaintiff,
v.
PECCOLE RANCH COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS

          ORDER

          MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         I. SUMMARY

         This case arises from the foreclosure sale of property to satisfy a homeowners' association (“HOA Sale”) lien. Before the Court are three motions: Defendant Peccole Ranch Community Association's (“HOA”) motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 70); Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Bank of America, N.A., Successor by Merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 71); and Defendant and Counter-Claimant Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9720 Hitching Rail's (“Saticoy Bay”) motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 72).[1]Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff properly tendered the superpriority amount, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and deny Defendants' cross-motions as moot, resolving this case.

         II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

         The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

         In April 2003, Edna E. Scott (“Borrower”) obtained a loan for $163, 567 (“Loan”) and executed a note secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”) on the real property located at 9720 Hitching Rail Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89117 (“the Property”). (ECF No. 71-1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff acquired the DOT via an assignment recorded on November 14, 2011. (ECF No. 71-2.)

         Borrower failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien on October 3, 2011, identifying the amount due to the HOA to date as $1, 434.04, which included $728.40 for “late fees, collection fees and interest.”[2](ECF No. 71-3 at 2.) The HOA recorded a notice of default and election to sell on December 29, 2011, identifying the amount due to the HOA to date as $2, 660.78. (ECF No. 71-4.)

         Plaintiff, acting through its agent (the law firm “Miles Bauer”) requested from NAS a calculation of the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien and offered to pay that amount.[3](ECF No. 71-5 at 3, 6-7.) While it never received a response from NAS, Plaintiff ultimately calculated what it believed to be the sum of nine months of common assessments based a statement of account from NAS on another property within the HOA and tendered that amount, $585 (“the Check”), on January 10, 2014.[4] (Id. at 3, 9-13.) Miles Bauer's records show the Check was “rejected.” (Id. at 4, 15-19.) /// /// The HOA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale on January 23, 2014. (ECF No. 71-7.) The HOA proceeded with the HOA Sale on February 14, 2014, and Saticoy Bay purchased the Property at the HOA Sale for $51, 500. (ECF No. 71-8.)

         Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all Defendants; (2) breach of NRS § 116.1113 against NAS and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against NAS and the HOA; and (4) injunctive relief against Saticoy Bay. (ECF No. 1 at 6-15.) Saticoy Bay asserts counterclaims for quiet title and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 8 at 5-6.)

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).

         The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

         Further, “when parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘[e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits.'” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (citation omitted). “In fulfilling its duty to review each cross-motion separately, the court must review the evidence submitted in support of each cross-motion.” Id.

         IV. ...


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