United States District Court, D. Nevada
M NAVARRO, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 18),
filed by Defendant Renato Libric (“Defendant”).
Plaintiff Moose Run, LLC (“Plaintiff) filed a Response,
(ECF No. 27), and Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 31). For
the reasons discussed herein, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
case arises from a fraudulently induced wire transfer
Plaintiff made to Defendant's company, Bouxtie, Inc.
(“Bouxtie”). Plaintiff is a Wyoming company that
is registered to do business in Nevada. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3,
ECF No. 14). Defendant is a citizen of Croatia and resides in
California. (Id. ¶ 4).
November 2016, Plaintiff joined a networking association
operated by Keiretsu Forum (“Keiretsu”),
entitling Plaintiff to receive confidential information
concerning potential investment opportunities. (Id.
¶ 11). In July 2017, Keiretsu contacted Plaintiff to
inform it about Bouxtie, a start-up technology company based
in California. (Id. ¶ 12).
subsequently arranged a meeting between Plaintiff and
Defendant, Bouxtie's CEO. (Id. ¶ 13).
Shortly thereafter, Defendant solicited Plaintiff for
financing, stating that Defendant is a successful businessman
and that Bouxtie served as a lucrative business opportunity.
(Id. ¶¶ 14-16). Specifically, in August
2017, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that there was $5,
000, 000 committed to Bouxtie's Series B preferred stock
but had availability for up to $10, 000, 000. (Id.
¶ 17). Plaintiff was provided with a presentation packet
that included expressions of interest from First Data
Corporation and Mastercard, Inc. for $150, 000, 000 and $300,
000, 000, respectively. (Id. ¶ 18). These
documents were later revealed to be forgeries.
August 2017 and March 2018, Defendant made efforts to entice
Plaintiff to invest in Bouxtie. (Id. ¶ 19).
Defendant sent Plaintiff a note purchase agreement and an
unsecured convertible note agreement, in addition to Series B
stock commitments from other investors, totaling $10, 000,
000. (Id. ¶ 20). Defendant also provided
Plaintiff a copy of Bouxtie's bank statement showing a
balance of $2, 175, 574.87. (Id. ¶ 21).
Plaintiff later learned that the bank record was falsified to
reflect at least $2, 000, 000 more than was actually in the
account. (Id.). In October 2017, Defendant sent
Plaintiff a forged corporate resolution from Bouxtie's
board indicating that Plaintiff's investment had been
October 13, 2017, Plaintiff wired $1, 500, 000 to
Bouxtie's bank account in Silicon Valley, California.
(Id. ¶ 26). In December 2017, Defendant
furnished an authorized stock certificate to Plaintiff
reflecting the issuance of 947, 049 shares of Series B
preferred stock in Bouxtie. (Id. ¶ 27).
Defendant also represented that David Lipson, a principal of
Plaintiff's, would have a seat on Bouxtie's board.
(Id. ¶ 28). According to Plaintiff, Defendant
made these assurances and provided the fabricated documents
without Bouxtie's knowledge or authority. (Id.
¶ 31). Shortly after Plaintiff wired funds to
Bouxtie's bank account, Defendant transferred the funds
to unknown accounts. (Id. ¶ 34).
filed its Amended Complaint on May 4, 2018, bringing the
following causes of action against Defendant: (1)
fraud/intentional misrepresentation; (2) conversion; (3)
fraudulent conveyance/transfer; (4) racketeering under NRS
207.470; (5) violation of NRS Chapter 90; and (6) unjust
enrichment. (Id. ¶¶ 35-78). Defendant
filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on June 1, 2018, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).
(See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”),
ECF No. 18).
to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Once a defendant raises
the defense, the burden falls on the plaintiff to prove
sufficient facts to establish that jurisdiction is proper.
Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.
2008). A plaintiff can carry its burden only by presenting
sufficient evidence to establish that (1) personal
jurisdiction is proper under the laws of the state where it
is asserted; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction does not
violate the defendant's right to due process secured by
the United States Constitution. Ziegler v. Indian River
Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995).
federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district
court applies the law of the forum state. See Panavision
Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir.
1998). Nevada has authorized its courts to exercise
jurisdiction over persons “on any basis not
inconsistent with . . . the Constitution of the United
States.” NRS 14.065. Thus, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is the relevant constraint on
Nevada's authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a
judgment of its own courts. World Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
Process Clause requires that the nonresident must have
“certain minimum contacts . . . such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'”
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only make “a prima facie
showing of jurisdictional facts.” Pebble Beach Co.
v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)).
When analyzing such a 12(b)(2) motion, “the court
resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.”
is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally
cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, and
although a court must take all factual allegations as true,
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are
insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly,
Rule 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual ...