United States District Court, D. Nevada
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, F/K/A BANK OF NEW YORK, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR THE STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II TRUST 2006-AR6, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-AR6, Plaintiff,
STONE CANYON WEST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Judge.
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
75), filed by Plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon
(“BNYM”) and Cross Defendant Nationstar Mortgage,
LLC (“Nationstar”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”). Defendant SFR Investments Pool,
LLC (“SFR”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 80), and
Plaintiffs filed a Reply, (ECF No. 81). Also pending before
the Court is SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
76), to which Plaintiffs filed a Response, (ECF No. 79), and
SFR filed a Reply, (ECF No. 82).
reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED and SFR's Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real
property located at 7972 Laurena Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada
89147 (the “Property”). (See Deed of
Trust, Ex. 1 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 75-1). In 2006, Juan
A. Chacon (“Chacon”) financed his purchase of the
Property by way of a loan in the amount of $188, 000.00
secured by a deed of trust (the “DOT”).
(Id.). BNYM became beneficiary under the DOT through
an assignment recorded on March 16, 2012, (see
Assignment, Ex. 2 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 75-2), and
Nationstar is BNYM's loan servicer, (see
Nationstar's Request for Foreclosure Notices, Ex. 10 to
Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 75-10).
Chacon's failure to pay all amounts due, Stone Canyon
West Homeowners Association (“HOA”), through its
agent Nevada Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”),
recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien in March 2010
and a subsequent notice of default and election to sell in
June 2010. (See Notice of Delinquent Assessment, Ex.
4 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 75-4); (Notice of Default and
Election to Sell, Ex. 5 to Pl.'s MSJ). During the time
period that Chacon's account was in collections, Chacon
made payments toward his delinquent account totaling $905.00.
(See NAS Collections File at 4-6, Ex. 5 to Pl.'s
MSJ, ECF No. 75-5).
2, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of foreclosure sale stating a
public auction would take place on July 28 of that year.
(Notice of Sale, Ex. 7 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 75-7). At
the sale, SFR purchased the Property for $13, 000 and
recorded a foreclosure deed on August 5, 2013. (Foreclosure
Deed, Ex. 8 to Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 75-8).
bring this quiet title action seeking a declaration that the
DOT continues to encumber the Property and that SFR's
interest in the Property is subject to this encumbrance.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 26-73, ECF No.
SFR asserts competing declaratory and injunctive relief
counterclaims against Plaintiffs,  as well as crossclaims
against Chacon for declaratory and injunctive relief.
(See Answer 14:8-16:5, ECF No. 20).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving
party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must
be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving
party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To
establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the
opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of
the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing
competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of
the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.
Id. at 249-50.
move for summary judgment on their quiet title claim,
asserting that Chacon's payments to NAS preserved their
DOT by extinguishing the HOA superpriority lien before the
sale. (Pl.'s MSJ 9:19-10:22, ECF No. 75). Plaintiffs
further contend that the DOT survived because the foreclosure
was conducted pursuant to a facially unconstitutional statute
and, alternatively, the Property's inadequate sales
price, in conjunction with other evidence of unfairness,
warrants setting aside the sale on equitable grounds.
(Id. 5:5-9:18, 10:23-15:20).
seeks judgment in the form of a declaration that it is the
title holder to the Property and that Plaintiffs' DOT was
extinguished by the foreclosure sale. (SFR's MSJ 27:2-5,
ECF No. 76). SFR asserts that Plaintiff's quiet title
claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and,
even if timely, cannot survive because Plaintiffs are without
standing to bring the claim. (Id. 20:7-23:9);
(see also SFR's Resp. 6:21-10:15, ECF No. 80).
Court begins with the threshold issues of the timeliness of
Plaintiffs' claim, the constitutionality of NRS Chapter
116, and Plaintiffs' standing to bring this action.
Statute of Limitations
to SFR, Plaintiffs' quiet title claim is time-barred
because the Complaint was filed outside of the applicable
three-year limitations period prescribed by NRS 11.190(3)(a).
(Id. 10:20-12:11). Plaintiffs respond, asserting
that under NRS 11.080, a five-year limitations period governs
the claim. (Pl.'s Resp. 6:3-17, ECF No. 79).
in this District apply either the four-year limitations
period under NRS 11.220, or else the five-year period set
forth in NRS 11.070 and 11.080 to a lienholder's quiet
title claim. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Azure Manor/Rancho de Paz Homeowners Ass'n, No.
2:16-cv-00764-GMN-GWF, 2019 WL 636973, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb.
14, 2019); Wilmington Tr., Nat'l Ass'n v. Royal
Highlands St. & Landscape Maint. Corp., No.
2:18-cv-00245-JAD-PAL, 2018 WL 2741044, at *2 (D. Nev. June
6, 2018). See also Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 ...