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Bank of America, N.A. v. Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

March 18, 2019

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiff,
v.
SUNRISE RIDGE MASTER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; DAISEY TRUST; and NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC., Defendants. DAISEY TRUST, Counterclaimant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Counterdefendant.

          ORDER

          MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         I. SUMMARY

         This case arises out of a foreclosure sale of property to satisfy a homeowners' association lien. Before the Court are three motions: (1) Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Bank of America, N.A.'s (“BANA”) motion for partial summary judgment on its quiet title/declaratory relief claim and on Defendant/Counterclaimant Daisy Trust's counterclaims (ECF No. 77); (2) Defendant Sunrise Ridge Master Homeowners Association's (“HOA”) motion for summary judgment on BANA's claims (ECF No. 78); and (3) Defendant/Counterclaimant Daisy Trust's motion for summary judgment on BANA's claims and on its counterclaims (ECF No. 79). The Court has reviewed the parties' responses (ECF Nos. 80, 81, 84) and replies (ECF Nos. 86, 87, 88.) The Court finds that BANA's tender preserved its deed of trust and will grant BANA's motion.

         II. BACKGROUND

         The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.[1]

         Michael F. Delapaz, Carolyn T. Delapaz and Ludivina C. Catacutan (“Borrowers”) purchased real property (“Property”) within the HOA with a $220, 864 loan (“Loan”) from BANA in 2005. (ECF No. 77-1.) The Loan was secured by a first deed of trust (“DOT”). (See id.) BANA is the beneficiary under the DOT. (Id. at 2-3.)

         The Borrowers failed to pay HOA assessments, and the HOA recorded the following notices through its agent, Nevada Association Services, Inc. (“NAS”): (1) notice of delinquent assessment lien on May 10, 2010 (ECF No. 77-2); and (2) notice of default and election to sell on July 13, 2010 (ECF No. 77-3).

         On March 30, 2012, BANA's agent (the law firm of Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom & Winters, LLP (“Miles Bauer”)) sent a letter to NAS asking it to identify the superpriority amount of the HOA lien.[2] (ECF No. 77-4 at 3, 6-7.) NAS did not respond. (Id. at 3.) BANA calculated the superpriority amount as $378 (the total of nine months of assessments) based on the ledger provided for a different property within the HOA and sent a check for that amount to NAS on April 12, 2012. (Id. at 3, 9, 13-15, 17.) NAS returned the check to Miles Bauer. (Id. at 4, 9.)

         The HOA then proceeded with the foreclosure sale (“HOA Sale”). The HOA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale on March 19, 2012. (ECF No. 77-5.) The HOA sold the Property on August 2, 2012, to Daisy Trust for $5, 470. (ECF No. 77-6.)

         BANA asserts the following claims: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all Defendants; (2) breach of NRS § 116.1113 against the HOA and NAS; (3) wrongful foreclosure against the HOA and NAS; and (4) injunctive relief against Daisy Trust. (ECF No. 1 at 6-13.) In the prayer for relief, BANA primarily requests an order declaring Daisy Trust took the Property subject to BANA's DOT. (Id. at 14.) Daisy Trust asserts counterclaims for quiet title and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 8 at 5-6.)

         III. LEGAL STANDARD

         “The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Id. at 250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).

         The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

         Further, “when parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘[e]ach motion must be considered on its own merits.'” Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting William W. Schwarzer, et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 499 (Feb. 1992)). “In fulfilling its duty to review ...


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