United States District Court, D. Nevada
J. DAWSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Complaint (#11). Plaintiff filed a response (#12) to which
Defendant replied (#16). Also before the Court is
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (#14). Defendant
filed a response (#17) to which Plaintiff replied (#19). Also
before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Relief Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) (#18). Plaintiff filed
a response (#20) to which Defendant replied (#22).
case emerges from the non-judicial foreclosure sale on or
about July 20, 2012 of the property located at 10802 Cape
Shore Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89166
(“Property”). This case shares a similar fact
pattern with many cases currently pending before this Court,
all having to do with HOA foreclosure sales. The several
motions presently pending before the Court center in whole or
in part around the question of what notice of default the
foreclosing party was required to provide Plaintiff prior to
its foreclosure sale on the Property. After the Nevada
Supreme Court's decision in SFR Investments Pool 1
LLC v. U.S. Bank, the Ninth Circuit decided Bourne
Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d
1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2016), holding NRS 115.3116(2)'s
statutory notice scheme was facially unconstitutional. In
light of Bourne Valley, what notice an HOA must
provide prior to foreclosing on a superpriority lien remains
April 21, 2017, in Bank of New York Mellon v. Star Hills
Homeowners Association, this Court certified the
following question to the Nevada Supreme Court:
“Whether NRS § 116.31168(1)'s incorporation of
NRS § 107.090 requires homeowners associations to
provide notices of default to banks even when a bank does not
request notice?” Bank of New York Mellon v. Star
Hill Homeowners Assoc., 2017 WL 1439671, at *5 (D. Nev.
April 21, 2017).
granting certification, the Court reasoned the following: In
Bourne Valley, the Ninth Circuit definitively
answered the question that the statute's
“opt-in” framework was unconstitutional.
Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,
832 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2016). However, that leaves
this Court with the unresolved question of what notice must
be provided. “It is solely within the province of the
state courts to authoritatively construe state
legislation.” Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd.
of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). As such,
state law questions of first impression like this one should
be resolved by the state's highest court. See
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944). Allowing
the Nevada Supreme Court to answer this question before
considering any other motions will provide this Court the
necessary guidance as to how to handle the issues of notice
and actual notice in light of Bourne Valley.
Bank of New York Mellon, the Court did not and could
not rely upon any controlling state law as to the
requirements of notice. This Court faces the same predicament
here. An answer to the above already certified question will
provide much needed clarity, and may be dispositive of many
of the issues currently before the Court in this case.
Stay of the Case
pending motions in this case implicate the previously
certified question regarding what notice state law requires.
To save the parties from the need to invest further resources
into the issues surrounding the notice requirement, the Court
sua sponte stays all proceedings in this case and
denies all pending motions without prejudice.
district court has the inherent power to stay cases to
control its docket and promote the efficient use of judicial
resources. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S., 248,
254-55 (1936); Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v.
Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 200).
When determining whether a stay is appropriate pending the
resolution of another case-often called a “Landis
stay”-the district court must weigh: (1) the possible
damage that may result from a stay; (2) any “hardship
or inequity” that a party may suffer if required to go
forward; and (3) “the orderly course of justice
measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of
issues, proof, and question of law” that a stay will
engender. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098,
1110 (9th Cir. 2005). Weighing these considerations, the
Court finds that a Landis stay is appropriate.
Damage from a stay
only potential damage that may result from a stay is that the
parties will have to wait longer for resolution of this case
and any motions that they have filed or intend to file in the
future. But a delay would also result from any rebriefing or
supplemental briefing that may be necessitated pending the
Nevada Supreme Court's answer to the ...