United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s
(“BANA”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No.
115). Defendants SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) (ECF No. 121) and Sonrisa Homeowners
Association (“the HOA”) (ECF No. 124) responded,
to which BANA replied (ECF No. 126).
before the court is the HOA's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 116). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 118).
before the court is SFR's motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 117). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 119), to which
SFR replied (ECF No. 127).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 1208 El
Viento Court, Henderson, Nevada 89074 (the
“property”). On April 21, 2010, Rick and Jennifer
Watkins obtained a loan from First Option Mortgage in the
amount of $152, 192.00 to purchase the property, which was
secured by a deed of trust recorded on April 28, 2010. (ECF
No. 1 at 3-4).
deed was assigned to BANA via an assignment of deed of trust
recorded on April 23, 2012. (ECF No. 1 at 4).
October 30, 2012, defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc.
(“NAS”), acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a
notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due
of $1, 565.73. (ECF No. 1 at 4). On January 4, 2013, NAS
recorded a notice of default and election to sell to satisfy
the delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $2,
765.43. (ECF No. 1 at 4).
April 19, 2013, BANA tendered to NAS $1, 125.00, what it
calculated to be the superpriority amount-i.e., the
sum of nine months of assessments. (ECF No. 1 at 5).
August 13, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of trustee's sale,
stating an amount due of $4, 443.81. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5). On
September 6, 2013, SFR purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale for $18, 000.00. (ECF No. 1 at 6). A
trustee's deed upon sale in favor of SFR was recorded on
September 9, 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 6).
April 14, 2016, BANA filed the underlying complaint, alleging
four causes of action: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment
against SFR and the HOA; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against
NAS and the HOA; (3) wrongful foreclosure against NAS and the
HOA; and (4) injunctive relief against SFR. (ECF No. 1).
February 15, 2017, the court dismissed claim (4) of
BANA's complaint. (ECF No. 95).
instant motions, BANA moves for summary judgment against the
HOA, NAS, and SFR, as well as on SFR's counterclaims (ECF
No. 115) and the HOA and SFR move for summary judgment as to
all claims asserted by BANA (ECF Nos. 116, 117).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
HOA and SFR's motions, they contend that summary judgment
in their favor is proper because, inter alia, the
foreclosure sale extinguished BANA's deed of trust
pursuant to NRS 116.3116 and SFR Investments. (ECF
Nos. 116, 117). The HOA further contends that the foreclosure
sale should not be set aside because the HOA complied with
all notice requirements under NRS 116 and BANA received
actual notice, NRS 116 is not barred by the Supremacy clause,
the HOA's rejection of BANA's tender was proper, and
the standard of commercial reasonableness does not apply to
foreclosure sales. (ECF No. 116). SFR further argues that
Bourne Valley is not controlling, BANA is not
entitled to an equitable remedy, and SFR is a bona fide
purchaser. (ECF No. 117). The court will address each
argument as it sees fit.
Nevada law, “[a]n action may be brought by any person
against another who claims an estate or interest in real
property, adverse to the person bringing the action for the
purpose of determining such adverse claim.” Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 40.010. “A plea to quiet title does not
require any particular elements, but each party must plead
and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff's right to relief therefore depends on
superiority of title.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore,
for plaintiff to succeed on its quiet title action, it needs
to show that its claim to the property is superior to all