United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Mary Riggs as personal
representative of the estate of Jonathan Neil Udall and
Philip and Marlene Udall's motion to remand. (ECF No.
15). Specially-appearing defendant Airbus Helicopters, Inc.
(“AHI”) filed a response (ECF No. 28), to which
Riggs replied (ECF No. 37).
before the court is defendants Matthew Hecker, Daniel
Friedman, Brenda Halvorson, Geoffrey Edlund, Elling
Halvorson, John Becker, Elling Kent Halvorson, Lon A.
Halvorson, Papillon Airways, Inc., d/b/a Papillon Grand
Canyon Helicopters, Xebec LLC, and Scott Booth's
(collectively, “the Papillon defendants”) motion
to remand. (ECF No. 19). AHI filed a response (ECF No. 28),
to which the Papillon defendants replied (ECF No. 38).
present action involves a dispute surrounding a helicopter
March 2, 2018, Riggs commenced an action in the Eighth
Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada, against
several individual and entity defendants stemming from a
February 10, 2018, helicopter crash. (ECF No. 1, Ex. 2). In
her claims against AHI, Riggs alleges that the subject
helicopter was defectively designed in that the fuel system
was not crash-resistant. Id.
18, 2018, AHI filed a petition for removal to this court.
Id. On June 8, 2018, Riggs filed a motion to remand.
(ECF No. 15). On June 15, 2018, the Papillon defendants filed
a motion to remand. (ECF No. 19). On July 9, 2018, AHI filed
a motion to dismiss Riggs's complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 36). Riggs subsequently filed a
motion to defer briefing on the motion to dismiss (ECF No.
39), and a motion to shorten time (ECF No. 40).
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §
a defendant has thirty (30) days upon notice of removability
to remove a case to federal court. Durham v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)). Defendants are not
charged with notice of removability “until they've
received a paper that gives them enough information to
remove.” Id. at 1251.
“the ‘thirty day time period [for removal] . . .
starts to run from defendant's receipt of the initial
pleading only when that pleading affirmatively reveals on its
face' the facts necessary for federal court
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1250 (quoting Harris
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91
(9th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original)). “Otherwise,
the thirty-day clock doesn't begin ticking until a
defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended pleading,
motion, order or other paper' from which it can determine
that the case is removable. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.
plaintiff may challenge removal by timely filing a motion to
remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Remand to state court is
proper if the district court lacks jurisdiction. Id.
“A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a
particular case unless the contrary affirmatively
appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
1989). Thus, federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist
at the time an action is commenced. Mallard Auto. Grp.,
Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.Supp.2d 949, 952 (D. Nev.
2004) (citing Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal.
State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th
motion to remand, the removing defendant faces a strong
presumption against removal, and bears the burden of
establishing that removal is proper. Sanchez v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir.
1996); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67
(9th Cir. 1992).