United States District Court, D. Nevada
RICHARD LUCAS-MacGIBBON, individually; ESTATE OF MARIE CAROL LUCAS-MacGIBBON, Plaintiffs,
USAA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign company of unknown type; DOES 1-10, individually, Defendants.
ORDER (ECF NO. 21)
MIRANDA M. DU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
dispute involves a payout of benefits under two life
insurance policies (“Policies”) issued to Marie
Carol Lucas-MacGibbon (“Mrs. Lucas-MacGibbon”)
(ECF Nos. 21-5, 21-6) who passed away on June 18, 2013 (ECF
No. 1 at 11). Before the Court is Defendant USAA Life
Insurance Company's (“USAA Life”) motion for
summary judgment (“Motion”) (ECF No. 21).
Plaintiff Richard Lucas-MacGibbon (“Mr.
Lucas-MacGibbon”) filed a response (ECF No.
and USAA Life replied (ECF No. 23).
following reasons, the Motion (ECF No. 21) is granted.
time Mrs. Lucas-MacGibbon obtained the Policies from USAA
Life, she listed Mr. Lucas-MacGibbon and her biological son,
Daxim-Rey Lucas-Banagudos (“Mr.
Lucas-Banagudos”), as the beneficiaries. (ECF No. 21-5
at 21; ECF No. 21-6 at 17.) At all relevant times, Mrs.
Lucas-MacGibbon was listed as the primary insured, owner, and
“payor” under the Policies. (ECF Nos. 21-7, 21-8;
ECF No. 22-11 at 4.)
2006, Mrs. Lucas-MacGibbon changed the designated
beneficiaries under the Policies, making Mr. Lucas-Banagudos
the sole 100% beneficiary. (ECF No. 21-7 at 2.) Mr.
Lucas-Banagudos thereafter remained the sole beneficiary
through Mrs. Lucas-MacGibbon's death. USAA Life issued
payment under the Policies to Mr. Lucas-Banagudos in April
2014. (ECF No. 21-13 at 4.) The value of the Policies at the
time of Mrs. Lucas-MacGibbon's death totaled $600, 000
($300, 000 each). (ECF No. at 11; ECF Nos. 21-5,
Lucas-MacGibbon initiated this action in April 2017
challenging USAA Life's issuance of the benefits to Mr.
Lucas-Banagudos-his step-son. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) He advances
four claims for relief-breach of contract, bad faith, breach
of fiduciary duty, and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1 at
12-14.) USAA Life asserts that Mr. Lucas-MacGibbon's
claims are time-barred under the doctrine of laches, or in
the alternative fail for material misrepresentation, and
additionally alleges various affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 5
at 7-9; ECF Nos. 21, 21-1.)
purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials
when there is no dispute as to the facts before the
court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't
of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits “show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there
is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable
fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute
is “material” if it could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable
minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however,
summary judgment is not appropriate. See Id. at
250-51. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a
genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a
jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions
of the truth at trial.'” Aydin Corp. v. Loral
Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,
288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a
court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement
Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103
(9th Cir. 1986).
moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib.
Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the
moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden
shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the
pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through
affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the
dispute exists, ” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts, ” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT &
SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252.
Court agrees with USAA Life's argument that Mr.
Lucas-MacGibbon's claims are barred by laches (ECF Nos.
21, 21-1), and declines to address its alternative
is an equitable defense.” Danjaq LLC v. Sony
Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2001). It bars a
plaintiff who, “with full knowledge of the facts,
acquiesces in a transaction and sleeps upon his
rights.” Id. at 950-51 (quotations and
citations omitted). A defendant is entitled to relief under
the doctrine where the defendant proves “both an
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to
itself.” Co ...