United States District Court, D. Nevada
U.S. BANK, N.A., Plaintiff(s),
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, Defendant(s).
before the court is plaintiff U.S. Bank, N.A.'s
(“U.S. Bank”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF
No. 80). Defendant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC
(“SFR”) filed a response (ECF No. 84), to which
U.S. Bank replied (ECF No. 91).
before the court is SFR's motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 81). U.S. Bank filed a response (ECF No. 82), to
which SFR replied (ECF No. 90).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 2839
Bridleton Avenue, North Las Vegas, Nevada, 89081 (the
21, 2005, Vichearith Khuon (“borrower”) purchased
the property. (ECF No. 80). On July 25, 2005, a deed of trust
was recorded against the property securing an amount of $276,
150.00. Id. The deed of trust identified Universal
American Mortgage Company, LLC as the lender, Stewart Title
Company as the trustee, and MERS as the beneficiary.
December 15, 2011, an assignment of deed of trust was
recorded, whereby U.S. Bank was assigned all beneficial
interest in the note and deed of trust. (ECF No. 80).
12, 2009, the borrower filed a voluntary petition for chapter
7 bankruptcy. (ECF No. 80). On September 28, 2009, a
discharge of debtor was filed in the borrower's
bankruptcy case. Id.
November 17, 2009, a notice of delinquent assessment lien was
recorded against the property by Alessi & Koenig, LLC
(“A&K”), as agent for Azure Manor/Rancho de
Paz Homeowners Association (the “HOA”). (ECF No.
80). The notice stated an amount due of $1, 347.14.
Id. On January 14, 2010, a notice of default and
election to sell under homeowners association lien was
recorded against the property by A&K on behalf of the
HOA. Id. The notice stated an amount due of $2,
24, 2010, the final decree was filed in the borrower's
bankruptcy case, which stated that the estate was fully
administered, the trustee was discharged, and the chapter 7
case was closed. (ECF No. 80).
September 16, 2010, a notice of trustee's sale was
recorded against the property by A&K on behalf of the
HOA. (ECF No. 80). The notice stated an amount due of $3,
931, 44. Id.
November 5, 2010, U.S. Bank's predecessor-in-interest,
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc. (“BAC”), sent A&K a letter requesting a
payoff amount for the superpriority portion of the HOA lien.
(ECF No. 80-16). A&K's response on November 9, 2010,
indicated a total amount owed of $4, 481.44. (ECF No. 80).
The response did not specify the superpriority portion of the
lien. Id. On December 2, 2010, BAC sent a letter to
A&K that included a check for $495.00-the amount
calculated to be nine months worth of HOA assessments.
Id. A&K did not accept the check. Id.
August 14, 2012, a notice of trustee's sale was recorded
against the property by A&K on behalf of the HOA. (ECF
No. 80). The notice stated an amount due of $5, 651, 44.
September 12, 2012, a foreclosure sale took place whereby SFR
acquired the property for $7, 500.00. (ECF No. 80). A
trustee's deed upon sale was recorded against the
property in favor of SFR on September 24, 2012. Id.
Bank alleges the fair market value of the property was $136,
000.00 at the time of the foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 80).
August 11, 2015, U.S. Bank filed its complaint in this
action. (ECF No. 1). The complaint alleges the following
claims: (1) quiet title/declaratory relief against SFR; and
(2) permanent and preliminary injunction against SFR.
February 28, 2018, the court granted MERS and SFR's
stipulation to dismiss all crossclaims and counterclaims.
(ECF No. 85).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
initial matter, claim (2) of U.S. Bank's complaint will
be dismissed without prejudice as the court follows the
well-settled rule that a claim for “injunctive
relief” standing alone is not a cause of action.
See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour
Emp't Practices Litig., 490 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1130 (D.
Nev. 2007); Tillman v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No.
2:12-CV-346 JCM RJJ, 2012 WL 1279939, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13,
2012) (finding that “injunctive relief is a remedy, not
an independent cause of action”); Jensen v. Quality