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Bank of America, N.A. v. Monte Bello Homeowners Association, Inc.

United States District Court, D. Nevada

July 3, 2018

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP F/K/A COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP, Plaintiff,
v.
MONTE BELLO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Defendants. EAGLE INVESTORS, Counterclaimant,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Counter-Defendants.

          ORDER

          Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge.

         Pending before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 50), filed by Plaintiff Bank of American, N.A. (“Plaintiff”). Defendants Monte Bello Homeowners Association, Inc. (“HOA”) and Eagle Investors (“Eagle”) filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 53, 54), and Plaintiff filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 62, 67).

         Also pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 51), filed by HOA. Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF No. 63), and HOA filed a Reply, (ECF No. 68).

         Also before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 52), filed by Eagle. Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF No. 66), and Eagle filed a Reply, (ECF No. 69).

         For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED, HOA's Motion is DENIED, and Eagle's Motion is DENIED.

         I. BACKGROUND

         This case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real property located at 5115 Piazza Cavour Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89156 (the “Property”). (Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1). On September 18, 2008, non-party Helene Jamora (“Borrower”) purchased the Property by way of a loan in the amount of $127, 632.00 secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”) recorded on September 29, 2008. (See Deed of Trust, Ex. A to Pl's Mot. Summ. J. (“MSJ”), ECF No. 50-1). Plaintiff became beneficiary of the DOT through a subsequent assignment recorded on October 10, 2011. (See Assignment, Ex. B to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-2).

         Upon Borrower's failure to pay all amounts due, HOA, through its agent ATC Assessment Collection Group, LLC (“ATC”), recorded a notice of delinquent assessment on April 21, 2010. (See Notice of Delinquent Assessment, Ex. D. to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-4). On May 28, 2010, HOA, through ATC, recorded a notice of default and election to sell. (See Notice of Default, Ex. E to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-5).

         On September 24, 2010, Plaintiff remitted payment to HOA, through ATC, to satisfy the super priority amount, and ATC rejected the tender. (See Exs. F3-F5 to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-6). On June 21, 2012, ATC, on behalf of HOA, recorded a notice of sale and a subsequent second notice of sale on December 19, 2013. (See Notices of Sale, Exs. H, I to Pl's MSJ, ECF Nos. 50-8, 50-9). HOA foreclosed on the Property on January 15, 2014, and a trustee's deed upon sale was recorded in favor of Eagle on January 29, 2014. (See Trustee's Deed Upon Sale, Ex. J. to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-10).

         Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on April 8, 2016, asserting the following causes of action arising from the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the Property: (1) quiet title through the requested remedy of declaratory judgment against all Defendants; (2) breach of Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) § 116.1113 against HOA and ATC; (3) wrongful foreclosure against HOA and ATC; and (4) injunctive relief against Eagle. (Id. ¶¶ 31-80). On June 13, 2016, Eagle filed an Answer asserting counterclaims against Plaintiff for 1) declaratory relief; 2) quiet title; and 3) slander of title. (See Answer ¶¶ 47-89, ECF No. 22).

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. “Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

         In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

         If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). ...


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