United States District Court, D. Nevada
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP F/K/A COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS SERVICING LP, Plaintiff,
MONTE BELLO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Defendants. EAGLE INVESTORS, Counterclaimant,
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al., Counter-Defendants.
M. Navarro, Chief Judge.
before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 50), filed by Plaintiff Bank of American, N.A.
(“Plaintiff”). Defendants Monte Bello Homeowners
Association, Inc. (“HOA”) and Eagle Investors
(“Eagle”) filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 53, 54), and
Plaintiff filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 62, 67).
pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 51), filed by HOA. Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF
No. 63), and HOA filed a Reply, (ECF No. 68).
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.
52), filed by Eagle. Plaintiff filed a Response, (ECF No.
66), and Eagle filed a Reply, (ECF No. 69).
reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's Motion is
GRANTED, HOA's Motion is
DENIED, and Eagle's Motion is
case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real
property located at 5115 Piazza Cavour Drive, Las Vegas,
Nevada 89156 (the “Property”). (Compl. ¶ 7,
ECF No. 1). On September 18, 2008, non-party Helene Jamora
(“Borrower”) purchased the Property by way of a
loan in the amount of $127, 632.00 secured by a deed of trust
(“DOT”) recorded on September 29, 2008.
(See Deed of Trust, Ex. A to Pl's Mot. Summ. J.
(“MSJ”), ECF No. 50-1). Plaintiff became
beneficiary of the DOT through a subsequent assignment
recorded on October 10, 2011. (See Assignment, Ex. B
to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-2).
Borrower's failure to pay all amounts due, HOA, through
its agent ATC Assessment Collection Group, LLC
(“ATC”), recorded a notice of delinquent
assessment on April 21, 2010. (See Notice of
Delinquent Assessment, Ex. D. to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-4).
On May 28, 2010, HOA, through ATC, recorded a notice of
default and election to sell. (See Notice of
Default, Ex. E to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-5).
September 24, 2010, Plaintiff remitted payment to HOA,
through ATC, to satisfy the super priority amount, and ATC
rejected the tender. (See Exs. F3-F5 to Pl's
MSJ, ECF No. 50-6). On June 21, 2012, ATC, on behalf of HOA,
recorded a notice of sale and a subsequent second notice of
sale on December 19, 2013. (See Notices of Sale,
Exs. H, I to Pl's MSJ, ECF Nos. 50-8, 50-9). HOA
foreclosed on the Property on January 15, 2014, and a
trustee's deed upon sale was recorded in favor of Eagle
on January 29, 2014. (See Trustee's Deed Upon
Sale, Ex. J. to Pl's MSJ, ECF No. 50-10).
filed the instant Complaint on April 8, 2016, asserting the
following causes of action arising from the foreclosure and
subsequent sale of the Property: (1) quiet title through the
requested remedy of declaratory judgment against all
Defendants; (2) breach of Nevada Revised Statute
(“NRS”) § 116.1113 against HOA and ATC; (3)
wrongful foreclosure against HOA and ATC; and (4) injunctive
relief against Eagle. (Id. ¶¶ 31-80). On
June 13, 2016, Eagle filed an Answer asserting counterclaims
against Plaintiff for 1) declaratory relief; 2) quiet title;
and 3) slander of title. (See Answer ¶¶
47-89, ECF No. 22).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary
adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
“Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable
jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's
favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship,
521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1999)). A
principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for
summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it
must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or
defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways:
(1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to
establish an element essential to that party's case on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving
party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must
be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving
party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To
establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing
party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987). In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid
summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations
that are unsupported by factual data. Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). ...