United States District Court, D. Nevada
M. Navarro, Chief Judge.
before the Court is Defendant Wayne N. Hage's
(“Hage's”) Motion to Stay Collection of Judgment
and Motion for Relief, (ECF No. 497). Plaintiff the United States
of America (the “Government”) filed a Response,
(ECF No. 498), and Hage failed to file a reply. For the
reasons discussed herein, Hage's Motion is
instant Motion arises from a judgment entered by the Court in
favor of the Government and against Hage, (see ECF
Nos. 487, 488). On April 10, 2008, the Government filed its
Amended Complaint seeking damages for trespass and injunctive
relief against Defendants Hage in his individual capacity,
Hage in his capacity as executor of the Estate of E. Wayne
Hage, and the Estate of E. Wayne Hage (the
“Defendants”). (ECF No. 37). In the Amended
Complaint, the Government avers that since January of 2004,
Defendants continuously and unlawfully allowed their cattle
to graze on public lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) and the National Forest System
(“NFS”). (Id. ¶¶ 13-21). The
case was initially assigned to Judge Robert C. Jones, who
held a bench trial in the matter between March 27, 2012, and
June 6, 2012. (See ECF Nos. 328-29, 342-61).
24, 2013, Judge Jones issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law in which he concluded, inter alia, that
Defendants' water rights provided a defense to many of
the alleged instances of unlawful trespass. (See
Order 101:14-104:23, ECF No. 415). The Clerk of Court
thereafter entered judgment in favor of the Government for
two instances of trespass, and in favor of Defendants with
respect to the remaining instances of alleged trespass.
(Clerk's J., ECF No. 416). The Government subsequently
appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
(See Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 421); (see
also Am. Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 424).
appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment with regard to
the Government's trespass claims. See United States
v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2016). The
Ninth Circuit instructed that the “district court shall
enter judgment for the government on all claims supported by
the record, shall calculate appropriate damages, and shall
enter appropriate injunctive relief.” Id. at
721. On remand, the instant action was reassigned to this
Court. (See Minute Order, ECF No. 446).
April 7, 2016, the Court ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing whether state or federal law
governs the calculation of damages and, based upon that
answer, the appropriate method for computing damages owed by
Defendants to the Government. (Order on Mandate, ECF No.
452). On April 15, 2016, Defendants filed a petition for writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court seeking
review of the Ninth Circuit's decision. See Estate of
Hage v. United States, No. 15-1295, 2016 WL 1605072
(Apr. 15, 2016).
23, 2016, the Court held a status conference, (see
ECF No. 472), with the parties during which the Court made
the following rulings from the bench. The Court held that
liability was limited to Hage in his individual capacity and
that the Estate, as well as Hage in his capacity as executor
of the Estate, were not liable. (See Status
Conference Tr. 49:17-20, ECF No. 473). The Court further
granted the Government's request for an injunction
“prohibiting defendant from placing or allowing
unauthorized livestock to enter or be on public lands
administered by the federal government.” (Id.
49:20-25). In addition, the Court stayed entry of judgment
pending a dispositive decision by the Supreme Court, and
ordered Hage to pay a bond to be calculated based on the
number of cattle remaining on federal lands. (Id.
50:1- 8). During the pendency of Hage's appeal to the
Supreme Court, Hage paid $20, 462.44 as a bond for the
continuing trespass. (See ECF Nos. 480, 484). On
October 17, 2016, the United States Supreme Court denied
Defendants' petition for certiorari. See Estate of
Hage v. United States, 173 S.Ct. 332 (2016).
February 27, 2017, the Court vacated Judge Jones' order
in its entirety, ordered that judgment be entered in favor of
the Government, and concluded that Hage is liable to the
Government for damages amounting to $587, 294.28. (Order
11:22-12:2, ECF No. 487). The Court ordered Hage to pay to
the Government $555, 040.50 for willful and repeated
unauthorized grazing on public lands administered by the BLM;
$11, 791.34 to the Government for unauthorized grazing on NFS
lands; and $20, 462.44 to the Government that was previously
deposited as a bond with the Clerk of Court during
Defendants' then-pending appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. (Id. 12:3-13:10). The Clerk of Court
subsequently entered judgment in favor of the United States,
(ECF No. 488). On March 2, 2017, Hage filed a Notice of
Appeal, (ECF No. 489). Pursuant to his appeal, Hage filed the
instant Motion on January 1, 2018. (ECF No. 497).
to Rule 62(d), the Court may grant a motion to stay the
execution on a judgment pending an appeal. Fed.R.Civ.P.
62(d). The movant is entitled to the stay if it furnishes a
proper supersedeas bond under Rule 62(d). Bass v. First
Pac. Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir.
2000). “The bond amount ordinarily includes the full
judgment total, costs on the appeal, interest, and any
damages for delay.” Branch Banking and Tr. Co. v.
Jarrett, No. 3:13-cv-00235-RCJ-VPC, 2014 WL 4636049, at
*3 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2014). “The purpose of the
supersedeas bond is to preserve the status quo while
protecting the non-appealing party's rights pending
appeal.” Id. (quoting Poplar Grove
Planting and Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1979)). A movant may be
entitled to a waiver of the full bond requirement and a
discretionary stay only in extraordinary cases. See
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1367
(9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the moving party “has the
burden of objectively demonstrating to the court the reasons
why a full bond should not be required.” Branch
Banking and Tr. Co., 2014 WL 4636049, at *3 (citation
Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding only in the following
circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud;
(4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir.
1985). “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must be requested
within a reasonable time, and is available only under