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Bank of America, N.A. v. Riverwalk Ranch Crossing Homeowners Association

United States District Court, D. Nevada

June 28, 2018

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiffs,
v.
RIVERWALK RANCH CROSSING HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

          ORDER

         Presently before the court is plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s (“BANA”) motion for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 40). Defendants Riverwalk Ranch Crossing Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) (ECF No. 50) and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC (“SFR”) (ECF No. 51) responded, to which BANA replied (ECF No. 52).

         Also before the court is SFR's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 41). BANA filed a response (ECF No. 47), to which SFR replied (ECF No. 55).

         Also before the court is the HOA's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 42). Defendant Absolute Collection Services, LLC (“ACS”) joined (ECF No. 43) and BANA filed a response (ECF No. 49), to which the HOA replied (ECF No. 54).

         Also before the court is the parties' stipulation for an extension of time to file responses. (ECF No. 44).

         I. Facts

         This case involves a dispute over real property located at 4508 Silverwind Road, North Las Vegas, Nevada 89031 (the “property”).

         On August 11, 2009, Alan Kolb (“the borrower”) obtained a loan in the amount of $191, 627.00 from DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd. in order to purchase the property. (ECF No. 40). The loan was secured by a deed of trust recorded on September 4, 2009. (ECF No. 40). The deed of trust was assigned to BANA via an assignment of deed of trust recorded on March 21, 2012. (ECF No. 40).

         On November 2, 2011, ACS, acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due of $1, 281.91. (ECF No. 40). On February 10, 2012, ACS recorded a notice of default and election to sell, stating an amount due of $2, 240.08. (ECF No. 40). On June 20, 2012, ACS recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating an amount due of $3, 852.62. (ECF No. 40).

         On March 8, 2012, BANA requested the superprioirty amount of the HOA lien from ACS. (ECF No. 40). On behalf of the HOA, ACS sent a letter to BANA refusing to provide a ledger. (ECF No. 40). ACS's letter to BANA further stated that “We recognize [BANA's] position as the first mortgage company as the senior lien holder.” (ECF No. 40-F).

         On November 6, 2012, Val Grigorian (“Grigorian”) purchased the property for $6, 300.00 at the foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 40). The trustee's deed upon sale was recorded on November 8, 2012. (ECF No. 40). Grigorian transferred his interest in the property to SFR via quitclaim deed recorded on September 17, 2014. (ECF No. 40).

         BANA filed the underlying complaint on September 21, 2016. (ECF No. 1). The complaint alleges four claims of relief: (1) quiet title/declaratory judgment against all defendants; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 against the HOA and ACS; (3) wrongful foreclosure against the HOA and ACS; and (4) injunctive relief against SFR. (ECF No. 1).

         In the instant motions, BANA moves for partial summary judgment on its claim for quiet title/declaratory judgment (ECF No. 40) and the HOA and SFR move for summary judgment as to all claims asserted by BANA (ECF Nos. 41, 42).

         II. Legal Standard

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

         For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

         In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

         By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).

         If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).

         In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by ...


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