United States District Court, D. Nevada
R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter centers on a nonjudicial-foreclosure sale conducted in
2014 under Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes
(“NRS”). After the foreclosure sale, the Ninth
Circuit struck down the notice scheme employed by NRS
116.3116 et seq. as facially unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Bourne Valley Court Tr. v.
Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2296 (2017).
Plaintiff Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) now moves for summary judgment on
its declaratory relief claim against defendant Huffaker Hills
Unit No. 2 Residence Association (“Huffaker
Hills”). ECF No. 1. No. opposition was filed.
the Bourne Valley decision supports Fannie Mae's
position, the court denies the motion for summary judgment
without prejudice because Fannie Mae relies on allegations
contained in its complaint and disputed in Huffaker
Hills' answer rather than sufficient evidence.
2007, Ana Ramirez (a non-party) obtained a loan to purchase a
property located at 7529 Bluestone Drive, Reno,
Nevada. ECF No. 1, Exs. 1, 3. This transaction
gave rise to a deed of trust on the property, which was
recorded in Washoe County, Nevada. ECF No. 1, Ex. 3. The deed
of trust designated Mortgage Electronic Registration
Services, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary.
Mae alleges that it became the beneficiary under the deed of
trust one month later. ECF No. 24 at 3 (citing ECF No. 1 at
¶ 24). Huffaker Hills denied the allegation in its
answer to the complaint based on having insufficient
knowledge of the fact. ECF No. 10 at ¶ 12.
2013, a foreclosure deed upon sale was recorded against the
property. ECF No. 1, Ex. 8. Huffaker Hills had foreclosed on
the property as a result of delinquent HOA fees. ECF No. 1,
Ex. 5-8. Osbaldo Arceo purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale. See ECF No. 1, Ex. 8.
the foreclosure sale purportedly extinguished the deed of
trust on the property under which Fannie Mae was allegedly
the beneficiary, Fannie Mae sues Huffaker
Hills. ECF No. 1. It asserts a single claim
against Huffaker Hills, which seeks an order declaring that
the deed of trust continues to encumber the property because
NRS Chapter 116 deprived Fannie Mae of its due process rights
under the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1. Fannie Mae now
moves for summary judgment on the claim. ECF No. 24.
judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations, admissions, and other materials in the record
show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In assessing a motion for
summary judgment, the evidence, together with all inferences
that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); County of Tuolumne v. Sonora
Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).
moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court
of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On those
issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving
party must make a showing that is “sufficient for the
court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find
other than for the moving party.” Calderone v.
United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d
1129, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must point to facts supported by the record
which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese
v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.
2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on
the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not
appropriate. See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th
Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. The mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the party's
position is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute;
there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find
for the party. See Id. at 252.
Mae moves for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory
relief against Huffaker Hills, relying on the Bourne
Valley decision. ECF No. 24. Through the claim, Fannie
Mae seeks an order declaring that the foreclosure sale did
not extinguish ...