United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is petitioner Randall Chastain's
abridged motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 58).
before the court is petitioner's motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(ECF No. 61). The government filed a response (ECF No. 63),
to which petitioner replied (ECF No. 65).
before the court is the government's motion for leave to
file new authority. (ECF No. 66). Petitioner filed a
response. (ECF No. 67). The government has not filed a reply,
and the time for doing so has since passed.
March 16, 1995, petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of
bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)), two counts of armed
bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d)), and two
counts of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). (ECF No. 32).
August 29, 1995, the court sentenced petitioner to 60 months
imprisonment for the bank robbery and armed bank robbery
charges. (ECF No. 40). The court also sentenced petitioner to
240 months imprisonment for his first § 924(c)
conviction and 60 months imprisonment for his second §
924(c) conviction, to run consecutively. Id.
“Specifically, the Court found that [petitioner] had a
conviction for federal armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) and (d) which qualified as a ‘crime of
violence.'” (ECF No. 61). This resulted in a
combined imprisonment term of 360 months. Id. The
court entered judgment that same day. (ECF No. 41).
September 8, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (ECF
No. 42). On January 31, 1997, the appeal was dismissed. (ECF
instant motion, petitioner moves to vacate his conviction
pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551
(2015) (“Johnson”), and requests that
the court immediately release petitioner. (ECF No. 61).
prisoners “may move . . . to vacate, set aside or
correct [their] sentence” if the court imposed the
sentence “in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
Relief pursuant to § 2255 should be granted only where
“a fundamental defect” caused “a complete
miscarriage of justice.” Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 345 (1974); see also Hill v.
United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
on § 2255 motions are based on the fact that the movant
“already has had a fair opportunity to present his
federal claims to a federal forum, ” whether or not he
took advantage of the opportunity. United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). Section 2255 “is
not designed to provide criminal defendants multiple
opportunities to challenge their sentence.” United
States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993).
instant motion, petitioner requests that the court vacate his
allegedly erroneous convictions pursuant to Johnson.
(ECF No. 61). In particular, petitioner argues that his
§ 924(c) convictions violate the Constitution's
guarantee of due process.
Johnson, the United States Supreme Court held the
residual clause in the definition of a “violent
felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (“ACCA”), to be
unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2557. The ACCA defines
“violent felony” as any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that:
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of ...