United States District Court, D. Nevada
before the court is plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage LLC's
motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 70). Defendants SFR
Investments Pool 1, LLC (“SFR”) and Suncrest
Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) filed
responses (ECF Nos. 78, 79), to which plaintiff replied (ECF
Nos. 82, 83).
before the court is the HOA's motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 68). Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No.
74), to which the HOA replied (ECF Nos. 81).
before the court is SFR's motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 71). Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 76), to
which SFR replied (ECF No. 84).
case involves a dispute over real property located at 609
Twilight Blue Avenue, North Las Vegas, Nevada, 89032 (the
“property”). (ECF No. 40).
August 27, 2007, Tara Thompson and Joshua Thompson
(“the borrowers”) purchased the property pursuant
to a grant, bargain, sale deed. (ECF No. 70-1). The borrowers
obtained a loan in the amount of $222, 559 from Countrywide
Bank, FSB (“Countrywide”) to finance the
purchase. (ECF No. 70-2). The loan was secured by a deed of
trust recorded on February 11, 2008. Id.; (ECF No.
70-3). The deed of trust lists Countrywide as the lender and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the
beneficiary “solely as a nominee for Lender and
Lender's successors and assigns.” (ECF No. 70-3).
The covenants, conditions, and restrictions
(“CC&R”) governing the property contained a
mortgage protection clause. (ECF No. 70-4).
November 16, 2011, MERS assigned all beneficial interest in
the deed of trust to Bank of America, N.A.
(“BOA”). (ECF No. 70-5).
September 12, 2012, Nevada Association Services
(“NAS”), acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a
notice of delinquent assessment lien, stating an amount due
of $1, 086. (ECF No. 70-7). On October 29, 2012, NAS,
acting on behalf of the HOA, recorded a notice of default and
election to sell to satisfy the delinquent assessment lien,
stating an amount due of $1, 958.50. (ECF No. 70-8).
November 28, 2012, the borrowers filed a chapter 7 voluntary
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Nevada. (ECF No. 70-9).
20, 2013, NAS recorded a notice of foreclosure sale, stating
an amount due of $2, 910.27 and an anticipated sale date of
June 14, 2013. (ECF No. 70-10).
14, 2013, the HOA foreclosed on the property. (ECF No. 40).
SFR purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for $17,
000. (ECF No. 70-11). A foreclosure deed in favor of SFR was
recorded on June 25, 2013. Id.
10, 2013, BOA assigned all beneficial interest in the deed of
trust to plaintiff. (ECF No. 70-6).
8, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered a final decree
discharging the bankruptcy trustee and closing the
borrower's chapter 7 case. (ECF No. 70-9).
September 3, 2015, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint.
(ECF No. 1). On March 15, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint, alleging (1) quiet title/declaratory relief
pursuant to NRS 30 et seq., and NRS 40.10 [sic]; (2)
declaratory relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clauses; (3) quiet title under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's due process clauses;
(4) preliminary and permanent injunction; (5)
wrongful/defective foreclosure; (6) unjust enrichment; (7)
negligence; and (8) negligence per se. (ECF No. 40).
March 29, 2017, SFR filed counterclaims against plaintiff for
(1) declaratory relief/quiet title pursuant to NRS 30.010
et seq, NRS 40.010, and NRS 116.3116; and (2)
preliminary and permanent injunction. (ECF No. 45).
January 5, 2018, the bankruptcy court granted a retroactive
annulment of the automatic stay as applied to the property.
(ECF No. 86) (“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the automatic stay with respect to the real
property located at 609 Twilight Blue Avenue, North Las
Vegas, Nevada, 89032; Parcel No. 139-10-411-172 is ANNULLED
as of May 19, 2013.”)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A principal purpose
of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should
be construed in favor of the non-moving party. Lujan v.
Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
However, to be entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
determining summary judgment, a court applies a
burden-shifting analysis. The moving party must first satisfy
its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary
judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must
come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at
trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact
on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp.
Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480
(9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of
proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its
burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an
essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2)
by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden,
summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
consider the nonmoving party's evidence. See Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159- 60 (1970).
moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact
conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge
to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth
at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary
judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are
unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880
F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must
go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and
set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324.
summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Id.
initial matter, claim (4) of plaintiff's complaint and
claim (2) of SFR's counterclaim will be dismissed without
prejudice as the court follows the well-settled rule that
claims for “injunctive relief” standing alone are
not causes of action. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart
Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 490
F.Supp.2d 1091, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007); Tillman v. Quality
Loan Serv. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-346 JCM RJJ, 2012 WL
1279939, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2012) (finding that
“injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent
cause of action”); Jensen v. ...