from a district court order denying a postconviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge. Affirmed.
L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender, and Randolph M.
Fiedler and Tiffani D. Hurst, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
CHERRY, GIBBONS, PICKERING, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and
STIGLICH, JJ. 
district court denied appellant Randolph Moore's
postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus as
procedurally barred without conducting an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death
for his involvement in killing his friend Dale Flanagan's
grandparents. See Flanagan v. State, 112 Nev. 1409,
1412, 930 P.2d 691, 693 (1996). Moore filed the
postconviction petition at issue in this case on September
19, 2013, more than one year after remittitur issued from his
direct appeal. Thus, the petition was untimely filed.
See NRS 34.726(1). The petition was also successive
because Moore had previously sought postconviction relief.
See NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(2). Accordingly, the
petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of
good cause and prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS
34.810(1)(b), (2), (3). Moreover, because the State pleaded
laches, Moore was required to overcome the presumption of
prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800(2).
overcome the procedural bars, Moore argues that: (1) the
State's withholding of impeachment evidence violated
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), (2) his
attorneys were ineffective throughout the litigation of his
prior postconviction petition, and (3) he is actually
innocent of the death penalty.
claims that the State violated Brady by failing to
disclose evidence that would have impeached a witness who
testified at his trial, Angela Saldana. There are three
components to a successful Brady claim: "the
evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence
was withheld by the state, either intentionally or
inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was
material." Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67,
993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000). When a Brady claim is raised
in the context of a procedurally barred postconviction
petition, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating good
cause for his failure to present the claim earlier and actual
prejudice. State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599, 81
P.3d 1, 8 (2003). As a general rule, "[g]ood cause and
prejudice parallel the second and third Brady
components; in other words, proving that the State withheld
the evidence generally establishes cause, and proving that
the withheld evidence was material establishes
discussing this claim in more detail, we note that it is
inadequately pleaded. Before trial, the parties knew that
Saldana had been working with law enforcement and her uncle,
Robert Peoples, in order to obtain information about the
murders. Since then, Moore has consistently challenged
Saldana's role in the case. Although he alleges in his
opening brief that he has recently discovered new facts
putting the claim in a different light, he fails to identify
with specificity which facts this court previously considered
and which facts are new. Moore actually asserts that he is
under no obligation to "distinguish between
'new' facts and facts which were known and previously
presented." He is mistaken, as he bears the burden of
demonstrating that relief is warranted, which means he must
explain why he is raising this claim again, or if it is new,
why he did not raise it sooner. See NRS 34.810; NRS
34.810(1)(b). He also bears the burden of demonstrating that
the district court erred, which means he must demonstrate
that the State withheld material evidence and that he raised
the claim within a reasonable time. State v.
Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91, 95 n.3
(2012). Meeting these burdens requires being forthright: a
party cannot force the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing by withholding information about a claim. See
Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222,
225 (1984) (recognizing that a petitioner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing regarding his claim if it is not belied
by the record and, if true, would warrant relief).
provided some clarity at oral argument in this court.
Considering those assertions along with those raised in his
opening brief, what forms the basis of his Brady
claim is apparently the notion that rather than being a
willing participant in the investigation into Moore's
codefendant as previously believed, Saldana was forced to
participate against her will and was fed information by
Peoples, who had access to police reports. Assuming, without
deciding, that Moore raised this claim within a reasonable
time, we nevertheless conclude that he fails to demonstrate
that relief is warranted.
Moore's assertions as true, evidence that Peoples coached
and coerced Saldana's testimony constitutes favorable
evidence, see United States v. Scheer, 168 F.3d 445,
449 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that by "withholding
information regarding the prosecutor's threatening
remarks to a key prosecution witness, the government failed
to divulge material impeachment evidence that was, in
essence, exculpatory by virtue of its ability to cast
substantial doubt on the credibility of the witness");
see also Hunter v. State, 29 So.3d 256, 269 (Fla.
2008) (evidence that the State threatened a witness with a
life sentence if she failed to testify against the defendant
satisfied the first two prongs of Brady), in the
State's possession.However, we conclude that the allegedly
withheld evidence is not material. Moore asserts that the
evidence was material because the State needed Saldana's
testimony to corroborate the other witnesses' testimony
pursuant to NRS 175.291 (requiring corroboration for
accomplice testimony). But an accomplice is defined as one
who is liable for the identical offense charged against the
defendant, NRS 175.291(2), and several of the witnesses who
testified against Moore were not liable for first-degree
murder; further, impeaching Saldana would not have eliminated
her testimony, and therefore, it still could have been used
to corroborate the other witnesses.
materiality for the purposes of Brady focuses on
whether the withheld evidence might create a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the jury, Wearry v. Cain, __U.S.__,
__, 136 S.Ct. 1002, 1006 (2016) ("Evidence qualifies as
material when there is any reasonable likelihood it could
have affected the judgment of the jury." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Huebler, 128 Nev. at 202,
275 P.3d at 98 ("Normally, evidence is material if it
creates a reasonable doubt." (internal quotation marks
omitted)), not whether it implicates a state statute
requiring corroboration. Applying that test, Moore's
claim still fails. Saldana's secondhand testimony was not
a crucial part of the State's case. In contrast, numerous
witnesses testified that they observed Moore plan, commit,
and confess to the murders, including witnesses who
participated in the killings. Seegenerally
Turner v. United States, __U.S.__, __, 137 S.Ct. 1885,
1894 (2017) (concluding that withheld evidence was not
material when it would have required the jury to believe that
two witnesses falsely confessed even though their testimony
was "highly similar" to that of other witnesses).
Impeaching Saldana would not have undermined this testimony.
In light of this, Moore seems to acknowledge that he played a
role in the crime and that the jury would have so concluded
even if the allegedly withheld evidence was presented to
impeach Saldana, but he argues that it might have led to a
different penalty determination because it might have ...